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BOSWELL, SCOTT         
AN EXAMINATION OF OPTIMAL LEVEL OF CEO NARCISSISM: 
WHY, HOW, AND WHEN NARCISSISM IMPACTS FIRM PERFORMANCE 
 
Abstract of doctoral dissertation at the University of Missouri- St. Louis 
Dissertation supervised by Dr. Ekin Pellegrini 
Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) may have narcissistic tendencies that impact the 
firm and its performance.  We explore the definition of narcissism, how it is measured, 
and when it might be optimal or harmful to the firm’s performance.  Leaders exhibiting 
higher scores on one or more Dark Triad traits often are viewed negatively both inside and 
outside the firm.  Should such negative perceptions disqualify a leader who displays a 
measure of a Dark Triad trait?  This research answers the primary question, is there an 
optimal level of CEO narcissistic traits and if so, are there moderating factors that impact 
the level? 
Narcissism and leadership have been linked consistently in theoretical arguments. 
The question of narcissistic traits in leaders being either good or bad remains an open 
question.  In addition, since the inception of the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) in 1926, the question of what impacts securities prices has been deeply studied.  
However, the top organizational leaders’ impact on the movement of securities pricing has 
not yet been investigated as it pertains to their leadership characteristics.  We intend that 
this study will contribute to both theoretical disciplines.    
This research study contributes to the body of knowledge pertaining to narcissistic 
leadership.  Existing research does not assess the effectiveness, or non-effectiveness, of 
narcissistic leaders at various stages of a firm’s lifecycle, capitalization or industry.  We 
could find no existing research that defined performance or success as positive stock price 
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change.  We believe that this is a meaningful measure because it aligns the performance of 
management with the most important measure of shareholder satisfaction.     
The lack of available internal assessment data has required prior research to 
heavily focus on external measures of narcissistic traits.  The current study used data from 
the California Psychological Inventory (CPI) to measure the CEO’s level of narcissistic 
traits to examine the optimal level of CEO narcissism against the stock price and financial 
performance of the organization that they lead.  We expected and found a nonlinear 
relationship between CEO narcissism and both total return and CEO alpha.   
We looked at the relationship of total company stock return and other accounting 
measures such as return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) to understand the 
relationship between the CEO’s narcissistic traits and the firm’s financial performance and 
how that impacts the performance of the stock.  We also test how market capitalization, 
firm lifecycle, industry, and CEO’s problem-solving ability impact the optimal level of 
narcissism.   
We found a curvilinear relationship between CEO narcissistic traits and CEO 
Alpha and company total return.  The accounting measure, ROA did indicate a similar 
curvilinear relationship.  ROE was not statistically significantly impacted by the level of 
narcissism.  CEO problem solving ability did not moderate the relationship between 
narcissism and company performance.  Industry, company lifecycle, and capitalization did 
moderate the impact of narcissistic tendencies listed in order of importance but the 
impacts of lifecycle and industry did not support our a priori hypothesis.   
The research findings may provide guidance on CEO selection.  The information 
could be used by boards of directors and executive recruiters.  The information may help 
4 
CEO Narcissism and Firm Performance 
in CEO oversight and management, determining what needs to be monitored, and when it 
is time to make a change.  CEOs who are willing to assess and address their narcissistic 
tendencies may be able to better manage their organization through various phases of 
evolution. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 In a Psychology Today blog, Henriques (2012) discusses the leadership style and 
narcissistic personality of Steve Jobs, notable founder and former Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) of Apple, Inc.  Based on information gleaned from Walter Isaacson’s biography of 
Steve Jobs (2011) and from other research and observation, Henriques comments on 
reports of Jobs’ bullying tactics, lack of empathy, exploitation of others and other “overt 
characteristics” and draws the conclusion that Jobs displayed a narcissistic personality 
structure.  He goes so far as to offer his professional judgment that Jobs met the criteria 
for Narcissistic Personality Disorder (NPD).  Yet, given Jobs’ reputation as a creator and 
innovator of superb technological products, Henriques contemplates the dichotomy of the 
narcissistic leader who achieves remarkable results by posing the question: “Is it ok to be a 
bully if you produce brilliant products?”  Henrique confesses he is unable to answer that 
question.  
 In a related Psychology Today blog, Nadler (2012) also comments on excerpts 
from Isaacson’s book but refrains from making the NPD clinical diagnosis.  Rather, he 
offers several examples of behavioral criteria that suggest Jobs was a narcissist.  Nadler, 
too, grapples with the problem of the high-achieving narcissist and ponders whether it is 
“possible to have the same ends with a more humanistic and emotionally intelligent 
means?” (para. 14) 
 Researchers are increasingly intrigued by questions such as these posed in popular 
literature.  Scholarly literature is replete with research of narcissistic leaders and the 
performance of the firms they lead.  But, the story of Jobs’ adds a special twist.  While 
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among his colleagues there is a varied recollection of events, Jobs states in his 
commencement speech to Stanford University’s 2005 graduating class that he was fired by 
the company (Apple) he founded, although he was retained as its board chair.  He went on 
to create a new company (NeXt) but was sued by Apple for competing against it by 
recruiting Apple’s engineers.  He later was re-hired to lead Apple, which set the stage for 
the growth of a company having a portfolio of renowned products and services, and a 
market capitalization currently approximating $2 trillion. 
 Therefore, to Henriques and Nadler’s questions, the current study adds other 
questions.  Why would a narcissistic leader be fired and then rehired by the same 
company?  Should narcissistic leaders ever be hired?  If so, under what circumstances 
should they be hired?  To explore these questions, we examined previous research to 
understand a) how CEO narcissism is measured, b) the level of narcissistic traits that can 
be assessed in individual CEOs, and c) the financial performance of companies led by 
CEOs demonstrating various degrees of narcissistic behavior.  In this effort, we sought to 
discover if there are reported meaningful associations between highly narcissistic CEOs 
and the performance of their companies at various life cycle stages (or other potential 
moderators).  Our literature review did not reveal any studies that investigate this 
relationship.  Accordingly, to fill this gap in the literature, this study examines the 
following research questions:  What is the optimal CEO narcissism as defined by stock 
performance and other financial measures impacted by the CEO’s leadership?  What are 
the intervening moderators in the relationship between CEO narcissism and firm 
performance?   As a starting point, we depict the variables (see Figure 1.1) that initially 
served as a roadmap for our research design. 
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Figure 1.1: Initial Research Model 




















In our literature review which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2, we 
found that CEO narcissism has been frequently measured externally using publicly 
available data.  Furthermore, we found that various external measures would coalesce into 
one of five categories: written word, social media, photographic appearances, self-
importance, and personal rent extractions.  In this study, we are particularly interested in 
identifying moderators, such as a firm’s age, firm’s market cap, firm’s lifecycle stage, and 
possibly others that impact the CEO’s firm performance.  Our literature review supported 
some of our initial expectations, and based on previous research findings, we refined our 
methodology.  The revised research model is more parsimonious without sacrificing rigor 
or relevance (Figure 1.2). 
 
H2- H5 
CEO signature size: Narcissism 
expressed in written word 
CEO Twitter activity: Narcissism 
expressed in social media 
CEO annual report photos: 
Narcissism expressed in photographic 
appearance 
CEO use of the word “I”: Narcissism 
expressed by self-importance 
CEO annual compensation relative to 
direct reports: Narcissism expressed 
as personal rent extractions 
CEO Narcissism 
The rolling five year 
% change in stock 
price, normalized to 
industry sector 
Moderators: Company lifecycle, 
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Figure 1.2: Revised Research Model 
 
Olsen, Dworkis, and Young (2014)  














The final step of our research model adjustment included conducting a qualitative 
study with CMA (Boswell, Sansberry, & Stout, 2018).  Results highlighted that business 
psychologists in the management consulting community suggest there are challenges with 
solely relying on external indicators in assessing narcissistic traits.  Given the difficulty of 
accessing CEO narcissistic traits, we were pleased to be able to access California 
Psychological Inventory (CPI) scores anonymously and assess narcissistic trait measures 
with the 20 factors (Figure 1.3) in the (CPI).  The use of CPI in assessing narcissistic traits 
has been supported by previous research as discussed in the literature review in Chapter 2.  
The data was generously provided by the CMA who specialize in assessment, 
development, and coaching of high-level executives.  Upon commencing work with a 
client, CMA discloses to their clients that they have the ability to use the data for 
academic research purposes as long as confidentiality of both the participants and 
companies can be assured.  We have described the process of blinding of the data in 
Chapter 3 of this study.   
H2 
The rolling five year 
% change in stock 
price 1987- 2009, 
normalized to 
industry sector 
CEO photos in annual report 
CEO annual cash compensation 
relative to second highest paid 
executive 
CEO annual non-cash compensation 
relative to second highest paid 
executive 
CEO Narcissism 
Moderator: Revenue as a 
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 Our research expands the body of knowledge pertaining to narcissistic leadership 
by exploring an area relatively unaddressed by researchers.  Existing research does not 
assess the effectiveness, or non-effectiveness, of narcissistic leaders at various stages of a 
firm’s lifecycle, capitalization industry.  Harrison, Thurgood, Boivie, and Pfarrer (2020) in 
their study of CEO narcissism and risk utilize stock price to calculate standard deviation 
as a measure of risk, investigate the impact of narcissism on risk and then assess the 
impact of risk on total investor return.  We took a more direct path and defined 
performance or success as a positive stock price change. We consider both total return and 
return net of market, industry, and capitalization impact.  To add a direct connection from 
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CEO leadership to firm outcomes, we also examine accounting measures such as Return 
on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE) to explore the connection between CEO 
performance and stock price movement.  We believe that these measures are appropriate 
because they align CEO success with the success of the owner, the shareholder.  If 
companies and their boards are not making optimal decisions in their CEO selection, this 
research could be instructive as to how to make investment decisions based on the 
expected performance and level of the narcissism of their CEO. 
 Our research may provide guidance to those who recruit CEOs, such as a board of 
directors, seeking to acquire specialized talent suited to the company at a specific point in 
time.  Relatedly, it may offer guidance for CEO oversight should the findings suggest that 
degrees of CEO narcissism are predictors of company performance and ultimately may be 
an indicator of when it is time to make a change in the C-suite.  It also may be useful to 
CEOs who are willing to assess and address their narcissistic tendencies to better manage 
their organization through various phases of evolution.  
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Chapter 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW, THEORY, AND HYPOTHESES 
Narcissism and leadership have a complicated relationship.  Previous research that 
examined narcissistic traits and leadership found that narcissism may be viewed as a rather 
negative characteristic (Greaves, Zacher, Mckenna, & Rooney, 2014).  Savchuk (2019) 
highlights that we applaud the 10% of narcissistic CEOs that succeed as visionary but do 
not focus on the 90% that do not succeed.  Previous research has largely examined 
narcissism by its traits.  However, there is confusion in the literature related to the 
definition of narcissism, especially depending on the research discipline.  Narcissism may 
be interpreted as a clinical malady when viewed through a psychologist’s lens.  
Alternatively, we may view narcissistic traits that manifest through behavior and may not 
meet the clinical definition of narcissism as defined by the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM–5).  Rosenthal and Pittinsky (2006) discussed the 
confusion behind the definition of narcissism itself as trait based by coining a construct 
called “narcissistic leadership.”  This approach pulls away from the notion of defining 
narcissism in leadership as trait based.  Specifically, they call for defining narcissistic 
leadership by examining the dynamic between the psychological motivations and 
behaviors between the narcissistic leader and the constituents and institutions that they 
lead (Rosenthal & Pittinsky, 2006). 
Narcissism has been viewed as a dominant predictor of counterproductive work 
behaviors (CWB).  Specifically, Grijalva and Newman (2014) found that narcissism is the 
dominant predictor of CWB among the dark triad personality traits.  They also found that 
the relationship between narcissism and CWB is moderated by ingroup collectivism.  
Other negative traits such as arrogance, feelings of inferiority, insatiable need for 
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recognition and superiority, hypersensitivity and anger, irrationality, and paranoia 
(Rosenthal & Pittinsky, 2006) have also been connected to narcissism. 
Grijalva, Maynes, Badura, and Whiting (2020) uniquely evaluated the effect of the 
level of narcissism of the National Basketball Association (NBA) players and how it 
impacted team performance.  They concluded that the higher the level of narcissism of 
players on the team, the less they collaborated, thus negatively impacting team 
performance.  The underperformance increased the more team members became more 
familiar with each other through increased playing time.  
Hartog, Hoogh, and Belschak (2018) highlight that narcissistic leaders tend to 
favor subordinates that are self-promoting since they engage in self-promotion themselves.  
The study found a high degree of leader-member exchange (LMX) due to the likeness in 
styles.  Given narcissistic leaders are thus more likely to favor and promote fellow 
narcissists it creates a greater level of importance of finding the optimal narcissism traits 
in the top leader as that style can be propagated through the organization.   
Grijalva, Harms, Newman, Gaddis, and Fraley (2014) found that narcissism may 
display a positive effect on leadership emergence.  This finding is interesting as they also 
contribute to advancing the idea that there may exist a curvilinear trend in leadership 
narcissism effectiveness.  In looking at the upside to narcissism, Rosenthal and Pittinsky 
(2006) illustrate that due to great vision and dramatic action and that these leaders do not 
try to understand the future, they try to shape it. 
In distinguishing between positive and negative aspects of narcissism, numerous 
researchers made attempts to codify the positive aspects of narcissism including: 
“constructive” narcissism (Kets de Vries & Miller, 1997), “reparative” narcissism 
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(Volkan, 1980), “charismatic” narcissism (Post, 1993).  Michael Maccoby (2004) coined 
the term “productive narcissists” describing the notion of the narcissist’s ability to inspire 
people and shape the future.  Lubit (2002) distinguishes between “healthy narcissism” and 
“destructive narcissism”.  The healthy narcissistic leader shares similar narcissist traits as 
the destructive narcissist, such as the enjoyment of power.  However, they differ in the 
fact that the healthy narcissist has values and follows through on plans, whereas the 
destructive narcissist lacks values and easily gets bored.  Further, Lubit indicates that there 
are distinct foundational differences related to a narcissist’s childhood (see Table 2.1).  
This focus away from narcissism as pathological but related to developmental stages in 
childhood is further corroborated in Kohut’s theory of narcissism (Kohut, 1966).  It is 
important to remember that similar to our study’s conceptualization the idea of healthy vs. 
destructive narcissism refers to the level of the trait exhibited and how it impacts the 
CEO's performance.  Fatfouta (2019) evaluates the productive and negative aspects of 
narcissism and provides recommendations as to how to best select, assess, and develop 
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Table 2.1: Healthy vs. Destructive Narcissism 
 
Characteristic Healthy narcissism Destructive narcissism 
Self-confidence High outward self-
confidence in line with 
reality 
Grandiose 
Desire for power, 
wealth and 
admiration 
May enjoy power Pursues power at all costs, lacks 
normal inhibitions in its pursuit 
Relationships Real concern for others and 
their ideas; does not exploit 
or devalue others 
Concerns limited to expressing 
socially appropriate response when 
convenient; devalues and exploits 
others without remorse 
Ability to follow a 
consistent path 
Has values; follows through 
on plans 
Lacks values; easily bored; often 
changes course 
Foundation Healthy childhood with 
support for self-esteem and 
appropriate limits on 
behavior towards others 
Traumatic childhood undercutting 
true sense of self-esteem and/or 
learning that he/she doesn't need to 
be considerate of others 
 
Assessment of Narcissism via External vs Self-Report Measures (CPI) 
 Brennan and Conroy (2013) posed an important question that relates to our 
research: “Can personality traits of chief executive officers (CEOs) be detected at a 
distance?”  Their study analyzes the characteristics over time of a bank CEO who 
ultimately resigned in the wake of the 2008 banking crisis.  Specifically, these researchers 
address two questions: “(1) Is there evidence of hubris in the corporate narratives of the 
bank CEO letters to shareholders? (2) Did the evidence of hubris increase over the tenure 
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of the CEO?”  The researchers found that prior research supports the relationship between 
narcissism and hubris.  They analyzed the CEO’s annual letter to shareholders by coding 
each sentence for indicators of hubris and concluded that a pattern of increasing hubris 
occurred over time.  While admitting that other researchers might subjectively interpret 
the sentences and arrive at a different conclusion, Brennan and Conroy (2013) 
nevertheless report that there is statistical significance in their findings and that they 
believe other coders would arrive at similar conclusions.  Hence, they suggest that CEO 
psychological factors may be measured using external means. 
 An exhaustive literature review by O’Reilly, Doerr, Caldwell, and Chatman (2014) 
enlightens their external assessment of narcissism.  Their study seeks to explore how CEO 
narcissism affects CEO compensation.  They discuss Mocaby’s (2007) characterization of 
Jobs as a “prototypical productive narcissist,” offering yet another confirmation of Steve 
Jobs as a narcissist.  O’Reilly et al. (2014) study is another example of previous research 
that externally measures CEO narcissism.  By surveying the CEOs’ employees and 
validating survey results with analyses of the CEOs’ word usage (from CEO letters to 
shareholders and quarterly earnings calls), the researchers found support for their 
narcissism metric created by the initial employee survey. 
 Another method for external measurement of CEO psychological factors was 
employed by Park, Kim, Chang, Lee, and Sung (2018) in their study of CEO hubris and 
firm performance at Korean firms.  Because adopted structures and governance of Korean 
firms mirror their Anglo-American counterparts, the researchers believe their research is 
applicable to Western-based firms.  They suggest that social desirability bias creates a 
challenge with self-reported psychological factors like hubris in CEOs   (Cycyota and 
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Harrison 2006; Tourangeau and Yan 2007).  They came to a similar conclusion with 
Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) who suggest that external indicators could be used to 
examine hubris.  Accordingly, Park et al. (2018) used various external metrics, such as 
media praise of CEOs, CEO’s awards and certificates, and CEO letters contained in 
annual reports to assess CEO hubris.  Factor analysis of the three indicators formed a 
single factor that was statistically and theoretically relevant.  While these results focus on 
hubris, we believe the methodology nevertheless has utility in the study of other 
personality traits, such as narcissism. 
 A comprehensive method for external measurement of CEO narcissism is part of a 
study by Marques- Illescas, Zebedee, and Zhou (2018).  In their research, they sought to 
determine the influence of CEO personality traits on the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) disclosures by reviewing the tone of earnings releases.  They 
measured narcissism using the three item scale developed by Olsen et al. (2014).  The 
three items are (1) prominence of CEO photographs in annual reports, (2) relative cash 
payment between CEO and the highest paid non-CEO executive, and (3) relative non-cash 
payment between CEO and the highest paid non-CEO executive.  Their research further 
supported the psychometric properties of the composite narcissism measure.   
 Sumner, Byers, Boochever, and Park (2012) investigate the relationship between 
Twitter activity, the Big Five personality traits, and the anti-social traits of narcissism, 
Machiavellianism, and psychopathy extending existing research into tweets as an indicator 
of the Dark Triad.  Although they found a strong correlation among the variables, they 
also report the results were significantly more predictive of traits across a population than 
the ability to predict the traits of an individual.  Further, their findings suggest that the use 
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of predictive models, such as crowdsourced machine learning algorithms may be 
imperfect in predicting Dark Triad traits from Twitter activity.   
Rijsenbilt and Commandeur (2012) follow the direction of much of the research on 
CEO narcissism as a negative behavior or outcome.  Their research indicates a statistically 
significant positive relationship between CEO level of narcissism and fraudulent corporate 
activities.  The authors suggest that narcissistic CEOs take bold action to obtain frequent 
praise with potentially detrimental consequences.  This research is another attempt in 
explaining the negative aspects of narcissistic CEO performance.  The study used 
numerous unobtrusive measures including cash and total compensation ratios, executive 
rank by salary, CEO exposure, awards, publications, number of lines used in biography, 
photographs in the annual report, perquisites, CEO power, governance index, CEO 
duality, number of official role titles, CEO acquisition behavior, number and value of 
acquisitions to assess CEO narcissism.   
Bodt, Bollaert, Grandin, and Roll (2015) utilized a linguistic method to assess 
narcissistic levels by reviewing interview transcripts and developing an I / We ratio. More 
recently, Gupta, Nadkarni, and Mariam (2018) measured CEO narcissism with the video-
metric approach, which has been recently employed by Petrenko, Aime, Ridge, and Hill 
(2015) and Gupta and Misangyi (2018).  We are intrigued by this approach because of the 
findings that unobtrusive ratings of personality traits have been suggested to have greater 
validity than self-report measures in assessing five-factor model (FFM) personality traits 
(Oh, Wang, & Mount, 2011).   
Research continues to investigate the addition of external measurement of 
narcissistic traits.  Fung, Qiao, Yau, and Zeng (2018) use videography to determine 
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narcissistic traits Similarly, Harrison et al. (2019) used text from transcripts of earnings 
calls to develop a tool to measure the big five traits (openness, conscientiousness, 
extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism).  They then applied their tool to 3,000 CEOs 
of Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 1500 firms and measured it against the trait's influence on 
strategic change.  Recent firm performance was supported as a moderator of the impact of 
narcissism on strategic change. 
As a pilot to this study, we performed a case study analysis (Boswell et al, 2018) 
by interviewing five highly experienced business psychologists to better understand the 
meaning of narcissism and how it should be interpreted in our study.  All five expressed 
concern with the efficacy of using external measures of narcissism.  Psychologist E in the 
study stated, “In our field, most of us hold pretty strongly that you don't diagnose 
somebody unless you treat them.”  Psychologist C stated, “You're trying to diagnose 
something from afar because you don't have direct access; proceed with caution.”  They 
suggested that narcissism is a clinical diagnosis reserved for private, rather than public, 
assessment of the individual being observed.  Even though none were aware of literature 
pertaining to external measures, they expressed skepticism that any such measures would 
be objective.  They also emphasized that impairment is the crossover from someone that 
exhibits narcissistic traits or tendencies to clinically diagnosed narcissistic disorder.  
Rosenthal and Pittinsky (2006) support this conclusion and offer the term “narcissistic 
leadership” to study leader narcissism. 
We find it appropriate, perhaps necessary, to proceed with a study focused on 
narcissistic traits or tendencies rather than that of a clinical definition and any attempt to 
measure narcissism from afar.   
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Why California Psychological Inventory (CPI)? 
The desired approach of using internal measures of CEO narcissistic traits is 
limiting.  Many CEOs have never been subjected to internal trait measurement.  Obtaining 
the data on CEOs that have participated in an internal study of their traits is difficult to 
source in great numbers due to confidentiality concerns.  The need for a sufficiently large 
number of CEO data points has historically resulted in the use of external unobtrusive 
measures.  We utilized internal evaluation data accessed through the CMA firm that 
participated in our pilot qualitative study.  The availability of over 62,000 employee 
assessments across 773 organizations utilizing the CPI allowed us to obtain data for a 
statistically meaningful analysis.   
The data includes CEO assessments comprised of the CPI containing 20 scales that 
based on the percentile indicated translate into the level of narcissistic traits of the 
measured executive (Wink & Gough, 1990).  We also had access to the Watson-Glaser 
critical thinking analysis to determine the level of those abilities in the CEO tested.  
It is not the intent to consider the assessment data a specific diagnosis, but rather 
an indicator of the level of narcissistic traits in the CEO.  Although not a specific 
diagnosis, the research on psychometric properties of the CPI in assessing leadership in 
specific situations with specific personality types (Gough, 1969) indicates that it has 
predictive power.  Additional studies have been completed and each confirms the validity 
of the assessment as a tool for measuring traits that impact how leaders lead (Carson & 
Parker,1966; Gough, 1989; Gough, 1990; Gough & Bradley, 1996; Megargee & 
Carbonell, 1988).  A criticism of self-report measures such as the CPI is that the 
participant can “game” the answers to make themselves look better.  CPI controls for that 
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by utilizing three validity measures imbedded in the questions (Research Department CPP 
Inc., 2007).  If the validity measure is triggered the results are disregarded.   
The CPI and Narcissism  
 Wink and Gough (1990) developed narcissism scales for the California 
Psychological Inventory (CPI) and the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory 
(MMPI).  These scales were developed based on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders, Third Edition  (DSM – III) building on previous research (Ahhatar & 
Thomson, 1982; Kernberg, 1975; Kohut, 1971, 1977).  The resulting 20-factor CPI scale 
consisted of 49 items to assess narcissism.  Research Department CPP Inc. (2007) confirm 
the validity in the current version of the instrument, the CPI 260.  We will use the CPI as 
the basis for our measure of narcissistic traits because whereas the MMPI focuses on 
clinical diagnosis, the CPI assesses common interpersonal behaviors in the general 
population which is more relevant for leadership research and practice.   
Narcissism and Firm Performance 
 Olsen et al. (2014) examine the relationship between firm performance measures 
of earning-per-share (EPS) and stock valuation compared to the narcissistic personality 
characteristics of CEOs of Fortune 500 companies.  Their work includes an examination 
of the definition of narcissism and various characteristics therein, including both positive 
and negative attributes.  They conclude in their analysis that companies that increase 
production and sales with the intent to favorably increase accounting measures positively 
correlate to the level of narcissism of the CEO.  These findings lend credence to our 
expectation that there may be an optimal level of CEO narcissism that relates to optimally 
performing companies.  
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 Judge, Piccolo, and Kosalka (2009) highlighted a contrary finding.  They found 
that one of the conclusions of the Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) study determined that 
although firm performance fluctuated over time under the leadership of a narcissistic CEO 
that the results were ultimately no different than their less narcissistic counterparts.   
 The Park et al. (2015) article offers another interesting insight. Although the 
authors did not use quantitative research to support their conclusion, they did conclude 
that the relationship between what they call a corporate psychopath and organizational 
damage is potentially nonlinear.  Their conclusion lends some credence to our expectation 
that there may be a nonlinear relationship between CEO narcissism and firm lifecycle 
performance.  
 Wonneberg (2007) conducted a study on the nature of narcissism within the 
organizational leadership using online assessments of 254 employees of financial services 
organizations.  He measured the level of narcissism through the organization and 
examined the relationship between narcissism and the Big Five personality traits 
(neuroticism, extraversion, open to experience, agreeableness, and conscientiousness). 
Although the study does not attempt to measure the impact of narcissism, Wonneberg’s 
findings provide incite as to the underlying drivers of employee behaviors and their 
reaction to levels of narcissism in their leader.  For example, the need for extroversion, 
assertiveness, and aggressiveness early in a firm’s development supports a potential 
hypothesis for a firm’s lifecycle stage to be an important moderator.  In addition, the 
conclusion that narcissism increased based on the number of leadership positions and the 
position of the person relative to the CEO is telling because it implies that a level of 
narcissism may be necessary to ascend within the organization.  Those same traits could 
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ultimately be a hindrance for the CEO during the mature phase of the company lifecycle 
due to the need for a leader that would typically be more steady handed, collaborative, and 
willing to put the firm's ongoing success in a stable state over their own need for 
recognition.   
 Wonneberg (2007) concludes that narcissism has a dualistic effect.  Grandiosity, 
arrogance, and envy can damage an organization due to societal demands for corporate 
responsibility.  Conversely, narcissistic tendencies can be helpful in the face of economic 
pressures.  The conclusion supports a potential hypothesis that there may be a non-linear, 
or possibly a curvilinear, relationship between narcissism and organizational success.   
CEO Leadership and Upper Echelons Theory 
 Upper echelons theory states that top management managerial background, 
personality, and characteristics are partial predictors of organizational outcomes 
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984).  Waldman, Javidan, and Varella (2004) utilized the theory to 
understand the role of the CEO in studying the impact of charismatic leadership.  
Peterson, Galvin, and Lang (2012) examined CEO servant leadership, narcissism, founder 
status, and organizational identification and how they impact firm performance measured 
by ROA.  They relied on upper echelons theory to explain the tie between CEO 
performance impact on firm performance.  The conclusion was that servant leadership did 
positively impact firm performance and was negatively related to narcissism (although not 
measured along a spectrum of traits) and positively to founder status.  They concluded that 
organizational identification partially mediated the relationship between narcissism and 
founder status to narcissism.  We will utilize upper echelons theory to explain the linkage 
between CEO personality (in this case narcissistic traits) and firm performance.   
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Bodt et al. (2015) highlight the importance of narcissistic traits in CEO leadership 
and that the optimal level will change over time.  They use the linguistic model described 
in the prior section to measure the change in the CEO’s level of narcissism.  They then 
studied if compensation and or board governance change contributed to the change in the 
level of the CEOs’ narcissism.   
Harrison et al. (2020) in their study of CEO narcissism and risk use CEO 
observable personality traits, such as conscientiousness, neuroticism, and extraversion and 
examine their influence on the market’s perception of the firm's risk and ultimately 
shareholder returns.  Linguistic tools from the authors predecessor study on narcissism 
measurement (Harrison et al., 2019) established the measures for conscientiousness, 
neuroticism, and extraversion.  Their study concluded that these CEO traits impacted the 
relationship between risk as measured by stock price volatility and return.  The traditional 
finance theories discussed in the following paragraphs outline the relationship between 
risk and return.  The impact of CEO personality traits extends upper echelon theory by 
demonstrating that CEO personality traits affect market perceptions and shareholder value 
creation.   
Our research differs from Harrison et al. (2020) study of CEO narcissism and risk 
in the following aspects, by utilizing the CPI as an assessment tool to determine the level 
of narcissistic traits, the research cited on CPI and the findings of Boswell et al. (2018) 
should produce a more accurate measurement of narcissistic traits.  In addition, the CPI 
allows us to measure the traits as a scale as opposed to the existence or nonexistence of a 
personality trait.  Although we find the examination of the change of the relationship of 
risk and return impacted by CEO personality interesting, we seek to find an optimal level 
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of narcissistic traits and by testing moderators will seek to explore whether the optimal 
level changes based on firm lifecycle, size or industry.   
Relevant Finance Theory 
As the above referenced research identifies linkage between narcissistic leadership 
traits and firm performance.  To translate that firm performance to the performance of the 
firm’s stock price, we identified three areas of finance literature that are pertinent to our 
research work: 1. Modern Portfolio Theory as a determinant in investor decisions. 2. 
Capital Asset Pricing Model to determine how securities are priced. 3. Efficiency Theory 
that connects the firm’s financial performance in the form of ROA and ROE to be 
translated into the stock price performance.  These theories create the basis for how a 
CEO’s leadership through the lens of upper echelons theory impacts firm performance that 
drives the stock price change. 
Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) 
Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) utilizes the mathematical framework of mean-
variance optimization to assemble a portfolio of assets that maximizes the expected return 
for a given level of risk (defined as the variance of share price).   The theory assumes that 
investors are rational and risk-averse, always choosing the portfolio with lower risk at any 
given level of return.  According to modern portfolio theory, the act of diversification can 
reduce portfolio risk  (see Figure 2.1).  The process is defined as a mean-variance 
optimization (Markowitz 1952, 1959).  To this day MPT is utilized by investment 
management firms large and small for asset allocation. 
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Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)  
Innovating on the work of modern portfolio theory by adding the concept of a risk-
free rate of return as defined currently and by mean variance optimizing your assets with 
price volatility one can create a security market line that was optimal and with proper 
diversification could eliminate asset specific volatility (nonsystematic) and only be left 
with the risk of the market (systematic risk) creating an efficient frontier.  In our analysis, 
this becomes important informed by the prior research that contends that CEOs with high 
narcissistic traits may be willing to assume more risk or may not perceive the level of risk 
as high as those with lower narcissistic traits.  The investor would position themselves on 
the efficient frontier known as the capital market line (CML) also known as the capital 
allocation line (CAL) (see Figure 2.2) based on their desired return or risk tolerance 




CEO Narcissism and Firm Performance 
Figure 2.2: Capital Asset Pricing Model 
 
 
Market Efficiency Theory  
An important assumption in MPT is the efficient dissemination of information to 
the market participants.  This allows  investors  to asses expected return and risk  Investors 
will  construct portfolios that are mean variance optimized  Realistically we know that all 
market participants do not have the same information at the same time thus making sub-
optimal investment decisions and market inefficiencies that can be exploited.  The 
academic work testing Modern Portfolio Theory suggests that in the short run due to the 
lack of perfect information creates less efficient portfolios security market line (SML). 
Over time information is available to all leading to rational decisions and an efficient 
market (Fama, 1968; Fama & French, 1992).  This imperfect information in the short term 
will impact the investors' beliefs about the firm, the CEO’s performance that is impacted 
by narcissistic traits.  
In Fama’s 1968 research he looks at security performance over time and attempts 
to show that in the short run there are pricing anomalies in the markets that informed 
investors can take advantage. In the long run, these same anomalies disappear and are 
arbitraged away as information becomes available to all investors. (Fama, 1968)    
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In the 1992 research by Fama and French, they illustrate that certain anomalies can 
last longer due to perceptions of risk in the security.  The basis of this assumption is 
formed in comparing the performance of growth vs. value stock portfolios.  (Fama & 
French, 1992) 
We believe that the risk perception that is analyzed in Fama and French (1992) 
could be similar to the risk in a CEO’s leadership style inside of the organization which 
leads us to include variables including capitalization and industry as moderators of the 
interaction between the CEO’s level of narcissistic traits and stock price performance.  
(see Figure 2.3) 
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Hypotheses 
 Is there an optimal level of CEO narcissism?  In our review of the literature on the 
dark side of leadership, we found that much of the previous research on dark side traits, 
such as narcissism illustrates the negative impact of these behaviors.  This study’s primary 
goal is to examine whether CEO narcissism is universally negatively related to firm 
performance. 
Boswell, Sansbery, and Stout (2019) in their quantitative analysis of narcissistic 
leaders’ impact on employee work attitudes supported the hypothesis that narcissistic 
tendencies coalesce into two categories, productive and non-productive.  Boswell et al. 
(2018) study concluded that lower levels of narcissistic tendencies are best for longer-term 
engagements where relationships are valued, and organizational culture is healthy.  Higher 
levels of narcissistic tendencies are best for shorter-term engagements where relationships 
and culture are not as important as getting quick results.  Our a priori assumption is that as 
the level of narcissistic traits reach either extremely high or low levels the leadership 
result would be sub-optimal.  At the highest levels, the leader may start to reach the 
diagnosed levels of narcissistic personality disorder and at minimum, the extreme nature 
may lessen their ability to work with others.  At extremely low levels the assumption is 
that the leader may have trouble operating with the ego strength necessary to deal with 
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In their meta-analysis of CEO narcissism, Cragen, Olsen, and Wright (2019) 
highlight several future areas to be examined in CEO narcissism research.  By utilizing 
personality assessment data, we hope to add to the methods to advance CEO narcissism 
research.  In addition, our work to find optimal narcissistic trait levels based on firm 
performance, moderated by lifecycle, size, and industry will help answer  what conditions 
create the demand for CEOs that have narcissistic traits and the consequences of those 
traits.   
Measuring the Optimal level of CEO Narcissism   
 This study attempts to measure the optimal level of CEO narcissism against the 
stock price performance of the organization that they lead.  We utilize various finance 
theories and upper echelons theory discussed in the prior section to tie the firm’s stock 
price performance more closely to the impact of the CEO.  We also looked at the impact 
of CEO narcissism on ROA and ROE. 
Described below is a measure of stock price change that we refer to as CEO alpha.  
The intent with this measure is to remove both positive and negative market and economic 
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factors that are outside of the control of the CEO.  Utilizing these tools, we intend to test 
the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1.  There is an optimal level of narcissism in an organization’s CEO as 
measured by the impact on the firm’s financial performance (total return, CEO Alpha, 
ROA, and ROE).  
Hypothesis 1a.  There is an optimal level of narcissism in an organization’s CEO when 
measured against the impact on a time-weighted % change in stock price during their 
tenure.  
Hypothesis 1-a1.  There is an optimal level of narcissism in an organization’s 
CEO when measured against the impact on a time-weighted % change in stock 
price (total return) during their tenure.  
Hypothesis 1-a2.  There is an optimal level of narcissism in an organization’s 
CEO when measured against the impact on a time-weighted % change in stock 
price (CEO Alpha) during their tenure.  
Hypothesis 1b.  There is an optimal level of narcissism in an organization’s CEO when 
measured against the impact on the average ROE and average ROA during their tenure.  
Hypothesis 1-b1.  There is an optimal level of narcissism in an organization’s 
CEO when measured against the impact on ROE during their tenure.  
Hypothesis 1-b2.  There is an optimal level of narcissism in an organization’s 
CEO when measured against the impact on ROA during their tenure.  
Walker (2017) highlights this extreme in writing about the negative impact of 
Elizabeth Holmes as CEO on the rise and fall of Theranos, illustrating the upper bound of 
narcissistic behavioral impact on a corporation.  We have chosen to measure firm success 
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by stock price performance of publicly traded firms as this is the ultimate benefit to the 
shareholder as owner.   Knowing that stock price change is impacted by many factors 
outside of the CEOs control including the economy and general market performance, 
industry performance, and capitalization of the company, we also created CEO Alpha as 
an additional dependent variable with the following equation: CEO Alpha = total return 
during CEO tenure– industry return of the index based on capitalization. We have also 
chosen to test ROE and ROA as dependent variables.  They have the benefit as publicly 
reported accounting measures to not be subject to stock market price volatility.   
We expected to find a nonlinear relationship between CEO narcissism as the 
independent variable regressed against total return and addition to CEO alpha, defined by 
the stock price change during the CEO's tenure, as the dependent variable.  We expected 
to find lower total return and CEO alpha in firms that are led by CEOs with low 
narcissistic tendencies given the potential inability to make challenging decisions.  We 
also expected to see an inflection point where the level of narcissism reaches the level that 
the leader’s ego-driven behaviors take precedence over the firm’s success.  Grijalva et al. 
(2014) conducted a meta-analytic review of narcissism and leadership.  They concluded 
that narcissism positively impacted leadership emergence (growth stage) and had no 
significant relationship to leadership effectiveness.  The authors conclude that this may 
mask an underlying curvilinear trend and move forward the idea that there may be an 
optimal level of mid-range narcissism.  
We felt that ROE and ROA had the same potential for a curvilinear relationship 
avoiding market pricing inefficiencies discussed in the above relevant finance literature 
(Fama, 1968; Fama &French, 1992).  Conversely, we also are concerned that previous 
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research has shown that CEOs with a high level of narcissistic traits engage in accruals 
management having a direct effect on ROE and ROA and thus jeopardizing the statistical 
significance of them as success measures (Capalbo, Frino, Lim, Mollica, & Palumbo, 
2017). 
The “CEO Alpha”.  We have chosen to measure firm success by stock price 
performance of publicly traded firms.  Mentioned above, stock price change is impacted 
by many factors outside of the CEO’s control including the economy and general market 
performance, industry performance, and capitalization of the company.  Although not a 
perfect measure we have chosen to define one of our dependent variables with the 
following equation: CEO Alpha = total return during CEO tenure – industry return by 
capitalization sector.  We utilized the Global Industry Code (GIC) Industry sector sub 
performance of the appropriate benchmark by capitalization (S&P 500 for Large Cap, 
S&P 400 for Mid Cap, and S&P 600 for Small Cap) as the industry return by 
capitalization sector.  We subtract the aforementioned company’s industry's performance 
to remove cyclical or event-driven market impact (an example being insurance industry 
stocks falling in a year with significant hurricane damage to their insureds).   
 The average CEO tenure in the United States is 5 years (Schulhofer, Marcec, & 
Benelli, 2018). We chose to measure the firm performance by using time-weighted returns 
over the tenure of the CEO given that the average 5-year tenure eliminated most short-run 
market inefficiency due to the lack of perfect information and that over time information 
is available to all leading to rational decisions and an efficient market.  (Fama, 1968; Fama 
& French 1992).  
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Potential Issues with CEO Alpha.  We strongly believe that the use of long-term 
stock price performance as a measure for CEO success is justified.  The CEO's primary 
duty is to the shareholder and the most unbiased measure of performing that duty is the 
risk-adjusted return provided to the shareholder.  Above, we discuss removing factors that 
the CEO does not control.  Our suggested CEO alpha does not consider price volatility 
(standard deviation of the stock price) or other measured risk factors.   
 In addition, short term stock price movement tends to be very collinear in the short 
term, meaning that today's stock price change is highly predictive of tomorrow's stock 
price movement.  Jagadeesh and Titman (1993) quantify this phenomenon in their 
research where they examine stock price movement and momentum. Jagadeesh and 
Titman (2001) evaluate alternative reasons for price momentum being a factor in return 
predictability.  We attempt to mitigate this potential issue by using 20 years of monthly 
stock performance data time-weighted over the CEO tenure.   
 The second major issue in the use of stock price returns is the endogenous nature 
of those returns.  There is a significant academic study in determining a model to predict 
or measure stock returns.  Many of these studies suffer from the fact that the error term 
when measuring the impact of the independent variable on the dependent variable is itself 
predictable or potentially explainable.  Fama and French (2004) illustrate the inherent 
weakness of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) by showing that the error term in 
Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) is predictable.  Jenson (1968) argues that the error term 
is not an error term but an alpha or excess positive or negative return.  Fama and French 
(2004) argue that the predictability itself invalidates the model and if it is predictable then 
the researcher needs to understand why.   
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 Fama and French (1995) attempt to randomize the error term by adding additional 
factors to the CAPM.  They introduce company size and book to value (which is come to 
be known as the 3-factor model.)  The addition of these factors randomizes the error term.  
They have also investigated adding robust vs week earnings performance and conservative 
vs aggressive portfolios to expand into a 5-factor model.   
 In order to address the endogenous nature of stock returns, we deploy Fama and 
French (1995) methods.  We do this by taking into account the return of the indexes in our 
measurement of stock returns.  Also, and most importantly, we are looking for CEO 
narcissistic traits to be a predictor or factor thus eliminating the predictability of the error 
term in our regression.   
 It is also noted that narcissistic tendencies can lead to the use of earnings 
management tactics to enhance the CEO's self-image (Anderson & Tirrell, 2004). 
Moderators 
It is expected that there are circumstances when greater or lesser levels of 
narcissistic tendencies are optimal, or at least desirable.  Figure 3.1 depicts the findings of 
Boswell et al. (2018) of the predicted level of CEO narcissistic traits for various firms’ 
situations. 
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 Since this study utilizes data only from public companies, we could not support or 
reject all the predicted levels from Boswell et al. (2018) but tested firm lifecycle, 
capitalization, and industry. 
Firm Lifecycle.  We hypothesize higher levels of optimal narcissism in early and 
declining stage companies.  We will test the company lifecycle stage (see Figure 2.4) as a 
moderator.  We expect that the optimal level of narcissism will be greater in growth stage 
and declining stage companies compared to mature companies that are in the prime of 
their existence.  Martinson (2014) used lifecycle as an antecedent to CEO selection and 
reviewed the various methods of defining the measurement of firm life cycle.  Like 
Martinson, we have chosen to focus on change in sales growth (Anthony & Ramesh, 
1992) as the determinate for assigning the life cycle to the firm.   
Hypothesis 2: Company lifecycle as measured by revenue change will moderate  
the relationship between CEO narcissism and firm performance, such that the  
relationship will be positive in the growth and declining stage, and negative in the  
maturity stage. 
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 Our thought is that growth firms need focused, strong-willed, perhaps stubborn, 
CEOs who can buffer criticism and drive success when others do not think it is possible.  
We speculate that mature phase firms perform optimally when led by stable, politically 
savvy CEOs who understand the needs of teams across diverse business disciplines.  
These characteristics point towards balanced CEOs with a lower level of narcissism as 
being optimal.  In the stage of decline, a firm often is facing stiff, existing competition as 
well as the introduction of new technologies and methods of doing business.  In this stage, 
we believe that leaders need a similar level of tough-mindedness as described in the 
growth stage of development, but for different reasons.  In the decline stage, we expect 
that CEOs must be willing to make tough decisions that can include tossing away existing 
products in favor of new technologies, eliminating or changing employees that have 
outdated skills, and shrinking the workforce.  Accordingly, in the decline stage, we 
envision CEOs with greater levels of narcissism than required in times of lesser demands. 
 Chatterjee and Pollock (2017) evaluate the need for CEOs with a high level of 
narcissistic traits to require a high level of acclaim externally and control internally.  This 
need impacts their board selection including choosing high profile directors that will bring 
them acclaim and exert less control in the organization.  To maintain control the same 
CEO will hire younger and less experienced lieutenants that will be subservient to the 
CEO.  The authors note that this is easier to do in growth stage companies given a flatter 
organizational structure thus allowing for a higher level of narcissistic control in start-up 
organizations.   
 Anecdotal evidence of this hypothesis can be ascertained by reviewing the blog 
from Psychology Today (Henriques, 2012) that references Steve Jobs’ early success at 
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Apple, his failure to succeed in the mature stage of company development, and his return 
during the organization’s decline to CEO where he positively changed the direction of the 
organization.  Another anecdotal episode involves Hunter Harrison, the now deceased 
railroad executive, who had a reputation for fixing organizations inside the declining 
railroad industry.  He reportedly was tough-minded and considered ruthless.  Recruited to 
serve as CEO and “fix” CSX, the board and shareholders saw the firm’s results improve 
until the time of his death (Southerland 2017).  This type of scenario leads us to believe 
that higher levels of leadership narcissism are required in turn-around situations such as 
when a firm is in steep decline.  
Firm Capitalization and Industry.  To measure CEO impact, we will attempt to 
remove factors in stock price performance that are outside of the influence of the CEO.  
By subtracting out market capitalization index-based performance, we eliminate market 
impact and capitalization impact from stock price performance.  We also removed the 
stock price performance of the industry by removing the industry impact (GIC code 
industry stock performance by using industry sector performance as calculated by the S&P 
500, S&P 400, and S&P600 indexes).  We tested if these same factors are moderators to 
the optimal level of narcissism.   
Hypothesis 3: Firm size as measured by capitalization will moderate the  
relationship between CEO narcissism and firm performance, such that the  
relationship will be positive in smaller capitalization firms and negative in larger  
capitalization firms. 
We hypothesize that we will see a shift in the level of narcissism with smaller 
capitalization companies.  This is impacted by the same factors in hypothesis 2 however 
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emphasizes that company size plays a role in determining the positive attributes of 
narcissistic traits such as healthy self-esteem and willingness to take risks.   
Hypothesis 4: The optimal level of narcissism will shift based on industry.  
 We hypothesized that the level of optimal CEO narcissism will shift based on the 
industry that the firm participates.  Although we are not hypothesizing the need in specific 
industries, potential attributes of the industry may accentuate the need for a leader with 
differing levels of narcissistic traits.  Examples include the need for a high level of 
creativity and or risk-taking in some industries.  On the other extreme as mentioned above 
in the CSX example, railroads are an example of a portion of an industry in decline and 
thus the need to have a CEO with higher levels of narcissistic traits.  These examples 
contrast with other steady-state or mature industries that may function better under a CEO 
with lower levels of narcissistic traits.   
The Smart Narcissist.  We hypothesized that for CEOs that have higher critical 
thinking ability, narcissistic traits may be more strongly and positively related to firm 
performance than those that score lower on this type of assessment, no matter the 
lifecycle, capitalization, or industry of the firm.  This concept first came to light in a 
qualitative study that the researcher competed with two co-authors as part of their DBA 
curriculum.  Boswell et al. (2018) found that the business psychologists interviewed had 
evidenced the ability for leaders with high problem solving abilities to be able to exhibit 
higher levels of narcissistic traits in any sector of the economy and still be successful if 
they showed greater critical thinking ability as measured by the Watson-Glaser 
assessment.  The authors coined the term “the smart narcissist”.  It was felt that these 
49 
CEO Narcissism and Firm Performance 
smart narcissists could use their critical thinking to better mask their negative aspects of 
narcissistic traits and accentuate the positive.  
Hypothesis 5: CEO’s critical thinking ability will moderate the relationship  
between CEO narcissism and firm performance, such that the relationship will be  
positive when CEO critical thinking ability is high and insignificant when CEO  
critical thinking ability is low.   
The Watson Glaser critical thinking assessment.  In 1925 Goodwin Watson, a 
professor, and E. M. Glaser, a student, at Columbia Teachers College created and 
published the assessment. (Person, n.d.)  The Watson Glaser critical thinking test is 
designed to assess an individual’s ability to digest and understand situations and 
information. Crites (1965) states that the assessment is effective at measuring problem 
solving ability.  More recent research by Sternod and French (2016) also confirms the 
validity of the test.  Additional research has utilized medical professionals (Bauwens & 
Gerhard, 1987) and collegiate level students (Wilson & Wagner, 1981) to test and support 
the psychometric properties of the test.  The assessment measures the respondent’s ability 
vs the general population and a college educated population.  Given our analysis is of the 
top leader in the organization we chose to use the subjects ranking for college educated 
individuals.    
Potential future moderators including risk-taking and narcissism.  Chattlerjee 
and Hambrick (2011) studied the risk-taking behaviors of CEOs.  They concluded that 
CEOs react to contextual signals as to when to take risk and when not to take risk.  They 
concluded that higher levels of narcissism make the CEO less sensitive to the contextual 
signals and thus willing to take more risk.  The study’s findings are similar to the work of 
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Campbell, Goodie, and Foster (2004) who found that compared to the general population, 
those with higher levels of narcissism were more willing to take a bet, were overconfident 
when taking bets, and made decisions on expected future performance, not past results.  
Zhu and Chen (2014) study the impact on director selection based on the level of 
narcissism of the CEO.  Assuming that CEOs with higher level of narcissistic traits would 
favor board members like them or that at least those used to working with CEOs in past 
assignments with similar traits, the risk profile of the firm could be elevated based on 
board oversite.  Although not part of this study we did provide the standard deviation of 
the stock returns over the CEO's tenure for future research. 
We speculate that venture capital firms and private equity firms seeking to acquire, 
and “flip” under-performing firms likely will benefit from highly narcissistic leaders.  Due 








We use a quantitative research design that emphasizes a positivist approach as it 
relates to the methodology of this study.  Quantitative research (Meyers, 2013; Van De 
Van, 2007) utilizes quantifiable measurements and statistical analysis of data.  The 
primary tool used for statistical analysis is IBM SPSS 26. 
Theories used in research design 
 As outlined in the literature review this study utilizes and relies on several 
financial theories including modern portfolio theory (MPT) (Markowitz 1952), capital 
asset pricing model (CAPM) (Sharpe 1964; Treynor, 1961) and market efficiency.  In the 
social sciences and leadership studies, previous research focused on breaking down the 
definitions of narcissism into component traits when measuring CEO narcissistic traits.  In 
addition, upper echelons theory (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) is the tie that links CEO 
personality traits to firm performance.  Although not primary to the research we also 
utilize human motivation theory (McClelland, 2009).  The theory states that humans are 
motivated by the need for achievement, affiliation, and power.  The connection with upper 
echelons theory is that the motivators that drive those with high narcissistic traits may be 
closely related to achievement and power. 
Data Collection and Research Sample 
 The primary independent variable (IV) level of narcissistic traits is a narcissistic 
trait composite that was calculated using the 20 behavioral factors identified in the CPI 
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(Carson & Parker,1966; Gough, 1989; Gough, 1990; Megargee & Carbonell, 1988) 
utilizing the 49 items identified in Gough and Bradley (1996).  
 To obtain the behavioral data we worked with CMA, a firm that specializes in the 
assessment, development, and coaching of high-level executives that either are candidates 
under consideration for hiring by a prospective employer or are already employed.  
Established in 1975, CMA annually advises 600 client companies and conducts more than 
6,000 leadership assessments.  They have worked with over 1,800 organizations since 
their founding.  The principals in the firm are licensed psychologists with significant 
experience and clinical practices that expose the firm to a broad range of clientele.  The 
firm’s informational materials state: “Our services are designed for any size or type of 
company, regardless of industry…”  It is with gratitude that we acknowledge the interest 
and support from the CMA staff and professionals and their significant contribution to this 
work. 
 CMA’s client disclosure and Missouri statute allows CMA to offer archival data 
for academic research purposes.  We have included our IRB approval in Appendix 1.  
CMA assured the required anonymity by blinding participant data, removing all 
information that could be used to identify the identity of the individual taking the 
assessment or the company that employed them at the time of the assessment. 
 Over 62,000 assessments were made available for the study.  The data set included 
the 20 CPI factors necessary to create the narcissism composite score, Watson Glaser 
critical thinking result measured against the college graduate population, title, and date of 
assessment.  We narrowed the data to the 1,999 assessments that were completed by 
individuals that held the title of chair, CEO, or president.  From this point forward in the 
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study, our reference to “CEO” is based on the assessment being completed by a 
respondent with the title of chair, CEO, or president. 
 Separately CMA provided a list of 773 companies that commissioned the 62,000 
assessments.  All assessments were completed between the years 2000 and 2019.  To 
create an additional level of anonymity, we did not know which of the companies had a 
CEO assessment associated.  We researched each organization to determine if they were 
public, private ownership, ESOP, private equity owned, or not for profit.  Companies that 
were public during some portion of the study comprise 262 of the 773 companies.  While 
researching if a company was public, we also looked for change of control of private to 
public, public to private, or acquisition by a public or private company.  We accessed 
shares outstanding to determine market capitalization for each firm.  All changes of 
control were utilized to determine the data that we gathered for each organization.   
 Utilizing Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) to access The Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) we downloaded monthly stock prices for each 
organization that was public during all or a portion of the 20 years evaluated.  Also 
accessed from CRSP were the companies’ GIC industry, monthly industry performance 
data, average industry ROE and average industry ROA for small, mid, and large-
capitalization stocks for each of the 10 industry groups.  Compustat data was accessed 
through WRDS to obtain quarterly ROE, quarterly ROA, and annual revenue for each 
organization for which it was available.   
 Monthly stock price data was converted to monthly time-weighted rate of return 
via the following equation: Monthly Return = (Stock Price Montht+1 - Stock Price Montht) 
/ Stock Price Montht.  Not all firms in the study were members of the S&P 500, S&P 400, 
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or S&P 600 indexes.  For that reason, we used the capitalization criteria for each index 
and compared the organization's market capitalization to categorize each organization as 
either large, mid, or small capitalization.  Annual revenue was converted to a revenue 
growth rate based on the equation: Revenue Growth = (Annual Revenuet+x – Annual 
Revenuet) / Annual Revenuet.  Each company was assigned a lifecycle category of growth, 
mature, or decline based on the research of Anthony and Ramesh (1992).  
 A data set including monthly firm total return, industry, capitalization segment, 
and lifecycle category was appended to the subset of the 773 companies.  CMA then 
blindly matched the above performance and descriptive data to the 62,000 assessments.  
We then screened the assessments only including those associated with a CEO, chairman, 
or president.  The data included 197 CEOs that had been assessed and led public 
companies.  Due to either company missing performance data or CPI data on the CEO, our 
final sample included 180 CEOs for whom we have a valid narcissism score and monthly 
investment performance data.   
 To ensure confidentiality, CMA took the aforementioned data and appended it to 
the subset of the corresponding 62,000 assessments. We screened the assessments based 
on employee title.  Only assessments that were completed by employees that had the title 
of chair, CEO, or president were included.    
Study Variables 
Dependent Variables 
 Time-weighted total return for each of the 180 observations was created by 
calculating a geometric mean of the monthly performance.  Total return is the dependent 
variable for hypothesis H1-a1.  An industry time-weighted weight of return was created 
55 
CEO Narcissism and Firm Performance 
for each of the 180 observations by calculating a geometric mean of the monthly 
performance of the industry the company is associated.  CEO Alpha was calculated by 
subtracting the industry time-weighted return from the time-weighted total return.  CEO 
alpha is the dependent variable for hypothesis H1-a2.  Average ROE and ROA were 
created by calculating the arithmetic mean of the quarterly company ROE and ROA.  
Average industry ROE and ROA for the industry of each company were created using 
arithmetic mean.  ROE and ROA net of industry ROE and ROA was calculated by 
subtracting average industry ROE and ROA from average company ROE and ROE. ROE, 
net ROE, ROA and net ROA serve as the dependent variables for H1-b1 and H1-b2 
respectively.  Although not part of the study we chose to also calculate the standard 
deviation of the monthly returns as a measure of volatility and total risk of the stock.  
Independent Variables 
Table 3.1 contains the correlation between the 20 CPI factors with defined 
narcissistic traits.  We created a raw narcissistic trait score by multiplying each 
assessments’ CPI descriptive score by the level of correlation to narcissism using the 
following equation (Table 3.1): 
NarcRaw=(Do*0.46)+(Cs*0.14)+(Sy*0.32)+(Sp*0.42)+(Sa*0.43)+(In*0.33)+(Em*0.25)
+(Re*-0.35)+(So*-0.28)+(Sc*-0.67)+(Gi*-0.5)+(Cm*-0.04)+(Wb*-0.19)+(To*-
0.38)+(Ac*-0.16)+(Ai*-0.08)+(Cf+0.02)+(Is*-0.06)+(Fx*-0.03)+(Sn*-0.39)    
A subject illustrating no narcissistic tendencies through their CPI results would receive a 
score of -271.63 and a subject illustrating maximum narcissistic tendencies through their 
CPI results would receive a score of 234.26.  To illustrate the results in percentile we 
created a Narcissism Composite variable by converting the range to a range of 0 to 100 
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using the following equation: NarcSc=((NarcRaw-(-271.63))/(234.26-(-271.63)))*100   
We felt it important to make this conversion of our independent variable to percentage to 
allow our work to be more accessible to practitioners.  CPI results are calculated and 
assessed based on the percentile to the general population.  Our calculation will facilitate 
using the narcissism composite in the same manner.   
 
Table 3.1: CPI 20 Factor Correlation to Narcissistic Trait Levels 
(Wink & Gough, 1990) factors updated by Research Department, CPP Inc. (2002) 
CPI Descriptive Statistics Correlation with Narcissism   
Dominance (Do) 0.46** 
Capacity for Status (Cs) 0.14** 
Sociability (Sy)  0.32** 
Social Presence (Sp) 0.42** 
Self-Acceptance (Sa)  0.43** 
Independence (In)  0.33* 
Empathy (Em)  0.25** 
Responsibility (Re)  -0.35** 
Social Conformity (So)  -0.28** 
Self-Control (Sc)  -0.67** 
Good Impression (Gi)  -0.5** 
Communality (Cm) -0.04 
Well-being (Wb)  -0.19** 
Tolerance (To)  -0.38** 
Achievement via Conformance (Ac)  -0.16** 
Achievement via Independence (Ai)  -0.08 
Conceptual Fluency (Cf) 0.02 
Insightfulness (Is)  -0.06 
Flexibility (Fx)  -0.03 
Sensitivity (Sn)  -0.39** 
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Moderators 
The industry variable utilizes the Global Industry Code (GIC) sectors.  We coded 
the 10 sectors (Table 3.2) and use the Hayes PROCESS macro in SPSS to evaluate if 
industry moderates the relationship between CEO narcissism and firm performance.  In 
2016 real estate was separated from financials, but to keep the data consistent for the 20 
years studied we left real estate included in the financial industry.   
 
Table 3.2: GIC Industry Codes 
 
 
 Company lifecycle and capitalization (Tables 3.2 and 3.4) were coded as described 
previously.  They were also evaluated with the Hayes Process macro in SPSS. 
 
Table 3.3: Company Lifecycle coding 
Category Code Compounded Annual 
Growth Rate (CAGR) 
Growth 1 > 20% 
Mature 2 >0% and < 20% 
Decline 3 <0% 
  
Communication Services 1 
Consumer Discretionary 2 
Consumer Staples 3 
Energy 4 
Financials 5 
Health Care 6 
Industrials 7 
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Table 3.4: Company Capitalization coding 
Category Code Capitalization 
Small Capitalization 1 < $1.4 billion  
Mid Capitalization 2 >$1.4 billion and 
<$8.2 billion 
Large Capitalization 3 >8.2 Billion 
 
Analysis 
 To test hypothesis H1 we conducted a linear regression in SPSS for each of our 
dependent variables (Return = H1-a1, CEO Alpha=H1-a2, ROE and net ROE  = H1-b1, 
ROA and ROA Change = H1-b2) with the narcissistic composite as the independent 
variable to determine the linear relationship and statistical significance.  Utilizing the same 
variables, we utilized the curve estimation analysis in SPSS to investigate the potential of 
a curvilinear shape.  We then utilized the Hayes PROCESS macro model 1 to 
independently test Industry, Capitalization, and Lifecycle as a moderator of the 
statistically significant relationships between the dependent variable and the narcissism 
composite.  We chose to evaluate each variable independently utilizing PROCESS model 
one.  Our goal is to understand the impact of each moderator independently and to avoid 
the potential for autocorrelation among our selected moderators.  A company may have 
attributes that are associated with industry, capitalization, and lifecycle.    
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Table 4.1 presents the descriptive statistics of all study variables.  Skewness and 
kurtosis are in or very close to the acceptable range of -1 to +1 normality for narcissism, 
industry, capitalization, and lifecycle.  Our dependent variables, Return, CEO Alpha, and 
both ROE and ROA measures are outside of the skewness and kurtosis bounds of 
normality.  Return and CEO Alpha have similar characteristics given CEO Alpha is 
derived from return.  Return and CEO Alpha show a negative skewness.  We will further 
elaborate in our discussion of outliers the reason for this variation.  Both measures of ROE 
are skewed positively, and both measures of ROA are skewed negatively.  All four 
dependent variables exhibit a high level of kurtosis illustrating a leptokurtic distribution.  
Figures 4.1 (Return), 4.2 (CEO alpha), 4.3 (ROE), 4.4 (net ROE), 4.5 (ROA), and 4.6 (net 
ROA) illustrate graphically the skewness and leptokurtic distribution of the dependent 
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Table 4.1:  Means, Standard Deviations, Skewness and Kurtosis for study variables 
 
 n M Md SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Narcissism composite 179 58.20 58.43 4.03 -.10 .02 
Watson Glaser- college  149 65.77 74.00 26.37 -.63 -.66 
Return 125 .03 .79 .21 -7.06 66.98 
CEO Alpha 125 -.06 -.03 .19 -7.95 78.27 
Standard Deviation 125 .10 .09 .58 1.22 .87 
Net Standard Deviation 125 .04 .03 .50 .97 .95 
Return on Equity 127 .77 .47 2.05 10.05 108.69 
Net Return on Equity 126 .33 -.47 2.24 7.27 68.99 
Return on Assets 127 .34 .26 3.03 -9.13 97.30 
Net Return on Assets 126 -.44 -.27 3.08 -8.32 86.16 
GIC Industry Code 180 5.18 5.00 2.29 -.27 -.37 
Capitalization Sector 180 1.68 1.50 .76 .60 -1.04 
Lifecycle segment 183 1.88 2.00 .67 .15 -.78 
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Figure 4.2: CEO Alpha Histogram 
 
Figure 4.3: Return on Equity Histogram 
 
Figure 4.4: Net Return on Equity Histogram 
  
62 
CEO Narcissism and Firm Performance 
Figure 4.5: Return on Assets Histogram 
 
Figure 4.6: Net Return on Assets Histogram 
 
Data Screening 
The initial sample size was N = 180.  Except for industry and capitalization, each 
variable had one or more missing values.  The variable with the most missing values was 
ROA with a final sample size of 126.  Missing data points represent unavailable CRSP 
data on Return and CEO Alpha, Compustat data on ROE and ROA, or complete CMA 
assessment data on Narcissism Composite and Watson Glaser.  The full listwise deletion 
leaves a remaining N = 82.  We contemplated options of replacing missing values with the 
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various methods available, a total listwise deletion, or a listwise deletion based on each 
analysis and the impact on our results.  Our desire to understand the statistical impact of 
all actual data available led us to eliminate data listwise on each analysis.  We felt the 
benefit of the actual data outweighed the benefit of the larger data sample with 
replacements or the use of only the 82 companies that had a complete data set.  We will 
discuss the pros and cons of this decision further in Chapter 5. 
 The listwise deletion in each regression varied slightly with N = 125 for return and 
CEO alpha and N = 124 for ROE and ROA.  When we introduce the third variable in 
testing moderation in hypotheses 2 through 5 the listwise deletion across three variables 
created a varying sample size in each equation. The minimum observations available 
(lifecycle variable) is 111.   
We conducted data screening for the dependent variables based on skewness and 
kurtosis values.  Univariate outliers were examined using Z-scores, based on Meyers et 
al.’s (2017) cutoff of 2.50 for extreme cases.  One outlier was detected for Return with the 
same outlier occurring in CEO Alpha.  ROE and ROA each had one unique outlier.  
Multivariate outliers were examined using Mahalanobis distances, with a cutoff of 18.467 
based on 4 df at p < .001.  One variable exceeded this value.  When these were removed, 
the scores appeared to be multivariate normal, and univariate normal for all dependent 
variables.  Accordingly, the sample size for the remaining analyses was N = 121.  
 Even considering the effectiveness of the variable removal in positively impacting 
normality, we chose not to eliminate the variables.  We were concerned about eliminating 
both very high and very low performing companies and the narcissism level of the CEOs 
whose organizations achieved the results.  The outliers contain explanatory power that is 
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important to our study.  We tested our concern by running regressions on both the full data 
set and the data with the outliers removed.  Our full data set created regressions that were 
statistically significant for return, CEO Alpha, and ROA (we will review the full 
regression results in the upcoming pages) (p < .05) and not statistically significant (p > 
.05) for the data set with outliers removed.  This confirmed our decision that the outliers 
did have a meaningful purpose in our study thus we chose to retain them and continue 
with the knowledge that our data has normality issues.   
 
Table 4.2:  Correlations among study variables 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. CEO narcissism           
2. CEO critical thinking .21*         
3. Return -.29** -.02        
4. CEO alpha -.27** -.01 .99**       
5. Return on equity .01 -.20* -.21* -.21*      
6. Net return on equity .11 -.22* -.24* -.24* .91**     
7. Return on assets .20* .21* -.07 -.01 -.05 .01    
8. Net return on assets .18* .20* .08 .09 -.08 .04 .97**   
9. Firm size .04 .04 .23** .19* -.01 .07 .12 .19*  
10. Lifecycle .08 .01 -.29** -.23* -.02 -.08 .04 -.04 -.13 
Note.  ** Correlation was significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); * Correlation was significant at 
the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 Bivariate correlations illustrate both expected and some unexpected results.  
Return and CEO alpha was significant and expectedly negatively correlated with CEO 
narcissism.  We will more fully study the linear and curvilinear relationship between these 
variables later in chapter 4.  Unexpectedly ROE and net ROE are significantly and 
negatively related to return and CEO alpha.  There are many potential anomalies that 
could influence this result.  First, often stock price change can be impacted by positive and 
negative financial results compared to equity analyst projections.  Analysts often rely 
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heavily on ROE as an indicator of company performance.  Companies missing 
expectations positively or negatively can impact stock price movements.  We will also 
more fully discuss in chapter 5 the potential for CEOs to manipulate financial results 
inside of the guidelines of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).  
Frequencies of Multi Categorical Modifiers 
 With N =180 we evaluated the distribution of the multi categorical modifiers.  The 
modifiers themselves were normally distributed.  Even with the normal distribution, 
evaluating 180 companies out of just under 4,000 public companies in the US the modifier 
may have underrepresented categories.  Although our data has geographic representation 
across the United States (US), it is more heavily weighted to the Midwest US based on the 
location of the CMA firm and their work.  Although they work with firms in all industries, 
Table 4.2 illustrates they have a concentration in financials, industrials, healthcare, and 
communication services.  Table 4.3 illustrates they represent more small-capitalization 
firms at 50% of the total compared to 35% for US companies in total. Table 4.4 illustrates 
an expected distribution of Lifecycle segments with 53.4% of the firms being mature, 
29.4% of the firms are growth stage and only 17.2% are in the decline stage.   
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Table 4.3: Industry Frequency 
 Frequency 
Communication services 22 
Consumer discretionary 9 
Consumer staples  8 
Energy 6 
Financials 59 
Healthcare  24 
Industrials 30 





Table 4.4: Capitalization Sector Frequency  
 Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Small 90 50.0 50.0 
Mid  57 31.7 81.7 
Large 33 18.3 100.0 
Total 180 100.0  
 




Decline  28 
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Hypothesis 1  
 For each of the six dependent variables, we ran a linear regression with Narcissism 
Composite as the independent variable looking for a statistically significant linear 
relationship between the two variables. A curve estimation was then performed to assess 
the existence of a curvilinear relationship. Both Quadratic and Cubic models were tested.  
We looked for an increased R2 and a meaningful positive change in F statistic to determine 
the optimal model taking into account the need for parsimony to gain utilization by 
practitioners.   
 Linear regression was conducted to examine narcissism as a predictor of company 
total return.  Except for the aforementioned skewness and kurtosis, the data met the 
assumptions of linearity, homoscedasticity (Figure 4.7a), and normality of residuals based 
on the examination of plots of standardized residuals against standardized predicted values 
(Figure 4.7b).  The overall model was statistically significant (F(1,122) = 10.946, p = 
.001), and indicated that narcissism composite explained a significant proportion of the 
variance in Return (R2 = .082).  The standardized regression coefficient was -.287 (p = 
.001) (see Table 4.5). 
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Figure 4.7a: Return Regression Scatterplot 
 
Figure 4.7b: Return Regression Normal P-P Plot 
 






t p B SE  
 (Constant) .95 .277  3.43 .001 
Narcissism Composite -.016 .005 -.287 -3.31 .001 
 
 Results illustrate that there is a statistically significant linear relationship between 
return and the narcissism composite.  The negative beta is consistent with Greaves et al. 
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(2014) supporting that narcissistic traits in CEOs may negatively impact company 
performance.  To test our hypothesis of an optimal level of narcissism we conducted a 
curve estimation to determine if the relationship is curvilinear.   
The quadratic model was statistically significant (F(2,121) = 8.299, p < .001), and 
indicated that the narcissism composite explained a significant proportion of the variance 
in Return (R2 = .121) an increase in R2 of .039 over the linear model.  The standardized 
regression coefficient was 3.633 (p = .03) and then -3.925 (p = .02) after the point of 
inflection (see Table 4.6).  
We then tested the cubic model which was statistically significant (F(2,121) = 
8.713, p < .001), and indicated that Narcissism explained a significant proportion of the 
variance in Return (R2 = .126) an increase in R2 of .005 over the quadratic model.  The 
standardized regression coefficient was 3.757 (p = .03) and then -4.058 (p = .02) after the 
point of inflection.  
 








R2  R2 
Step 1: Linear -.287*   .082*  
Step 2: Quadratic 3.633* -3.925*  .121** .039** 
Step 3: Cubic Excluded 3.757* -4.058* .126** .005** 
Note. * p<.05.  ** p<.01 
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 The regression statistics for the cubic model are slightly more predictive than the 
quadratic model, however, the cubic model excluded the narcissism composite and only 
allowed the squared and cubed variable to remain in the analysis thus still implying the 
best fit model had a quadratic shape.  SPSS eliminates a predictor variable if the variance 
is already contained in the other two variables (Field, 2014).  Due to the similarity of the 
two models as illustrated by the R2 statistics we retained the more parsimonious 
quadratic model which provides support for Hypothesis 1-a1. (Figure 4.8) 
 
Figure 4.8: Return Curve Estimation Graph 
 
 
 We followed the identical statistical analysis that we conducted to test hypothesis 
1-a1 to examine hypothesis 1-a2 by conducting a linear regression of narcissism as a 
predictor of company CEO alpha.  Except for the aforementioned skewness and kurtosis, 
the data met the assumptions of linearity, homoscedasticity (Figure 4.9a), and normality of 
residuals based on the examination of plots of standardized residuals against standardized 
71 
CEO Narcissism and Firm Performance 
predicted values (Figure 4.9b).  The overall model was statistically significant (F(1,122) = 
9.870, p = .002), and indicated that narcissism composite explained a significant 
proportion of the variance in CEO alpha (R2 = .075).  The standardized regression 
coefficient was -.274 (p = .002) (see Table 4.7). 
 
Figure 4.9a: CEO alpha Regression Scatterplot 
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t p B SE  
 (Constant) .743 .258  2.880 .005 
Narcissism Composite -.014 .004 -.274 -3.142 .002 
 
 Results suggest a statistically significant linear relationship between CEO alpha 
and the narcissism composite, although less than that of total return.  Like return, the CEO 
alpha negative beta supports the work of Greaves et al. (2014) in the negative relationship 
between CEO narcissism and firm performance.  To test the optimal level of narcissism, 
we conducted a curve estimation to determine if the function is curvilinear and if so, 
whether the curve is quadratic or cubic.   
 The quadratic model was statistically significant (F(2,121) = 7.9, p = .001), and 
indicated that narcissism composite squared term explained a significant proportion of the 
variance in CEO Alpha (R2 = .115) an increase in R2 of .040 over the linear model.  The 
standardized regression coefficient was 3.765 (p = .030) and then -4.044 (p = .020) after 
the point of inflection.   
 We then tested the cubic model which was statistically significant (F(2,121) = 
8.357, p < .001), and indicated that narcissism composite cubic term explained a 
significant proportion of the variance in CEO Alpha (R2 = .121) an increase in R2 of .006 
over the quadratic model.  The standardized regression coefficient was 3.930 (p = .028) 
and then -4.218 (p = .019) after the point of inflection. (see Table 4.8) 
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Table 4.9: Hierarchical Regression Analyses of Linear and Non-Linear Narcissism Terms 







R2  R2 
Step 1: Linear -.274*   .075*  
Step 2: Quadratic 3.765* -4.044*  .115* .040* 
Step 3: Cubic Excluded 3.930* -4.218* .126** .006** 
Note. * p<.05.  ** p<.01 
 The regression statistics for the cubic model are slightly more predictive than the 
quadratic model, however, due to the same exclusion of the narcissism composite variable 
illustrates that the best fit is a quadratic shape and provides support for the non-linear 
relationship outlined in Hypothesis 1-a2. (Figure 4.10) 
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In chapter 5 we will more fully discuss the reason for the similarity in result of 
total return to CEO alpha and our logic behind which we suggest will be more impactful 
to the practitioner. 
We followed the identical statistical process utilized to test hypothesis 1-a to 
examine hypothesis 1-b.  We conducted a linear regression to examine narcissism as a 
predictor of company ROE.  Unlike return and CEO alpha the data did not meet the 
assumptions of linearity, homoscedasticity (Figure 4.11a), and normality of residuals 
based on the examination of plots of standardized residuals against standardized predicted 
values (Figure 4.11b)  The overall model was not statistically significant (F(1,124) = .662, 
p = .417), and indicated that narcissism composite did not explain a statistically significant 
proportion of the variance in ROE (R2 = .005).  The standardized regression coefficient 
was .073 (p = .605). (see Table 4.9) 
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Figure 4.11b: ROE Regression Normal P-P Plot 
 
 






t p B SE  
 (Constant) -1.374 2.653  -.518 .605 
Narcissism Composite .073 .045 .073 .814 .417 
 
 The above analysis illustrates that there was not a statistically significant linear 
relationship between ROE and the narcissism composite.  We chose to still check to see if 
by testing a quadratic or cubic model statistical significance would be achieved.  Both 
models failed to be statistically significant.  The quadratic model was not statistically 
significant (F(2,124) = .450, p = .638), and indicated that narcissism composite explained 
a very small proportion of the variance in ROE (R2 = .007) an increase in R2 of .002 over 
the linear model.  The cubic model was also not statistically significant (F(2,124) = .463, p 
= .630), and indicated that narcissism composite explained a very small proportion of the 
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variance in ROE (R2 = .007) an increase in R2 of .002 over the linear model and the same 
as the quadratic model. (see Table 4.10) 
 
Table 4.11: Hierarchical Regression Analyses of Linear and Non-Linear Narcissism 







R2  R2 
Step 1: Linear .073   .005  
Step 2: Quadratic 1.011 -.939  .007 .002 
Step 3: Cubic Excluded .574 -.503 .007 .000 
Note. * p<.05.  ** p<.01 
 
 Although the results for average company ROE as the dependent variable were not 
statistically significant, we tested net ROE as a dependent variable before determining that 
the results do not support hypothesis 1-b1.  Net ROE also did not meet the assumptions of 
linearity, homoscedasticity (Figure 4.12a), and normality of residuals based on the 
examination of plots of standardized residuals against standardized predicted values 
(Figure 4.12b).  The overall model was not statistically significant (F(1,123) = 1.1389, p = 
.241), and indicated that narcissism composite did not explain a statistically significant 
proportion of the variance in ROE (R2 = .011).  The standardized regression coefficient 
was .106 (p = .241). (see Table 4.11) 
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Figure 4.12a: Net ROE Regression Scatterplot 
 
Figure 4.12b: Net ROE Regression Normal P-P Plot 
 






t p B SE  
 (Constant) -3.047 2.881  -1.058 .292 
Narcissism Composite .058 .045 .106 .814 .241 
 
 The above analysis illustrates that net ROE, although better than ROE, still does 
not have a statistically significant linear relationship with the narcissism composite.  We 
still checked to see if by testing a quadratic or cubic model statistical significance would 
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be achieved. Both models failed to be statistically significant.  The quadratic model was 
not statistically significant (F(2,122) = .4968, p = .383), and indicated that narcissism 
composite explained a small proportion of the variance in RO (R2 = .016) an increase in R2 
of .005 over the linear model.  The cubic model was also not statistically significant 
(F(2,123) = .987, p = .376), and indicated that narcissism composite explained a very 
small proportion of the variance in ROE (R2 = .016) an increase in R2 of .005 over the 
linear model and the same as the quadratic model. In addition, similar to the analysis 
utilizing return and CEO alpha the narcissism composite variable was excluded from the 
analysis (See Table 4.12). 
 
Table 4.13: Hierarchical Regression Analyses of Linear and Non-Linear Narcissism 







R2  R2 
Step 1: Linear .106   .011  
Step 2: Quadratic 1.049 -.908  .016 .005 
Step 3: Cubic excluded .847 -.745 .016 .000 
Note. * p<.05.  ** p<.01 
 
Net ROE illustrated a better fit than ROE, but not enough to be statistically 
significant.  The results fail to support Hypothesis 1-b1. 
We followed the identical statistical evaluation used in our testing of hypothesis 1-
b1to determine the level of support for hypothesis 1-b2.  We completed a linear regression 
to examine narcissism as a predictor of company ROA.  In addition to the aforementioned 
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skewness and kurtosis, the data although statistically significant did have issues with 
linearity, homoscedasticity (Figure 4.15a), and normality of residuals based on the 
examination of plots of standardized residuals against standardized predicted values 
(Figure 4.15b).  The overall model was statistically significant (F(1,124) = 5.251, p = 
.024), and indicated that narcissism composite explained a significant proportion of the 
variance in ROE (R2 = .041).  The standardized regression coefficient was .202(p = .024). 
(see Table 4.13) 
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Figure 4.13b: ROA Regression Normal P-P Plot 
 






t p B SE  
 (Constant) -8.427 3.839  -2.195 .030 
Narcissism Composite .151 .066 .202 2.282 .024 
 
 The above analysis illustrates that although there are challenges with the linearity 
there is a statistically significant linear relationship between ROA and the narcissism 
composite.  The linear regression analysis of the narcissism composite on return and CEO 
alpha produced negative betas.  Prior to performing the curvilinear analysis this would 
have led us to believe that narcissism was negative.  The linear regression analyzing the 
impact on ROA prior to the curvilinear analysis had a positive beta connotating that in this 
case more narcissism is good.  One possible explanation that we will more fully explore in 
chapter 5 is that narcissistic CEOs may have a greater tendency to manipulate earnings 
and thus impact ROA (Capalbo et al, 2017).  To once again test if there is an optimal level 
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of narcissism for this dependent variable, we conducted a curve estimation to determine if 
the function is curvilinear and if so, whether the curve is quadratic or cubic.   
 The quadratic model was statistically significant (F(2,123) = 3.631, p = .029), and 
indicated that narcissism composite explained a proportion of the variance in ROA (R2 = 
.056) an increase in R2 of .015 over the linear model.  The standardized regression 
coefficient was 2.809 (p = .134) and then -2.610 (p = .163) after the point of inflection.  
The cubic model was statistically significant (F(2,123) = 3.647, p < .029), and indicated 
that narcissism composite explained a proportion of the variance in ROA (R2 = .056) an 
increase in R2 of .015 over the linear model and the same as the quadratic model.  The 
standardized regression coefficient was 1.535 (p = .108) and then -1.339 (p = .160) after 
the point of inflection. (see Table 4.14).  Similar to the previous analysis a variable was 
excluded from the analysis by SPSS indicating that the impact on ROA was explained by 
the two included variables.  In this analysis Narcissism2 was excluded.  The same 
inference can be made that the two variables included in the model indicates a quadratic 
shatpe with one inflection point.   
 
Table 4.15: Hierarchical Regression Analyses of Linear and Non-Linear Narcissism 







R2  R2 
Step 1: Linear .202*   .041*  
Step 2: Quadratic 2.809 -2.610  .056* .015* 
Step 3: Cubic 1.535 excluded -1.339 .056* .000* 
Note. * p<.05.  ** p<.01  
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Figure 4.14: ROA Curve Estimation Graph  
 
 
 There is a statistically significant curvilinear relationship between the narcissism 
composite and ROA (Figure 4.16).  Since the R2 is small and the betas are not statistically 
significant, we will test net ROA before deciding to accept or reject Hypothesis 1b-1.   
Net ROA has the same issues of linearity, homoscedasticity (Figure 4.17a), and 
normality of residuals based on the examination of plots of standardized residuals against 
standardized predicted values (Figure 4.17b)  The overall model was statistically 
significant (F(1,123) = 3.959, p = .049), and indicated that narcissism composite explained 
a significant proportion of the variance in ROE (R2 = .031).  The standardized regression 
coefficient was .177(p = .024). (see Table 4.15) 
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Figure 4.15a: Net ROA Regression Scatterplot 
 
Figure 4.15b: Net ROA Regression Normal P-P Plot 
 






t p B SE  
 (Constant) -8.221 3.924  -2.095 .038 
Narcissism Composite .134 .067 .177 1.990 .049 
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 The results for net ROA are statistically significant but not as insightful as ROA, 
return, or CEO alpha.  We once again tested if there is an optimal level of narcissism for 
this dependent variable and conducted a curve estimation to determine if the function is 
curvilinear and if so, whether the curve is quadratic or cubic.   
 The quadratic model was statistically significant (F(2,122) = 3.649, p = .029), and 
indicated that narcissism composite explained a significant proportion of the variance in 
net ROA (R2= .056) an increase in R2 of .025 over the linear model.  The standardized 
regression coefficient was 3.543 (p = .060) and then -3.370 (p = .073) after the point of 
inflection.  The cubic model was statistically significant (F(2,123) = 3.647, p < .029), and 
indicated that the narcissism composite explained a proportion of the variance in net ROA 
(R2 = .056) an increase in R2 of .015 over the linear model and the same as the quadratic 
model. The standardized regression coefficient was 1.890 (p = .049) and then -1.721 (p = 
.073) after the point of inflection. (see Table 4.16) 
 
Table 4.17: Hierarchical Regression Analyses of Linear and Non-Linear Narcissism 







R2  R2 
Step 1: Linear .177*   .031*  
Step 2: Quadratic 3.543 -3,370  .056* .015* 
Step 3: Cubic 1.890* excluded -1.721 .056* .000* 
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Figure 4.16: Net ROA Curve Estimation Graph  
 
 
 There is a similar statistical significance of the curvilinear relationship for net 
ROA and ROA as the dependent variable with the independent variable remaining 
narcissism composite.  The betas are closer to being statistically significant vs. ROA and 
the quadratic and cubic relationship are also very close.  We have chosen to retain the 
quadratic model as it is more parsimonious than the cubic model that produced extremely 
similar results.  In addition, the excluded variable in the cubic model indicates a quadratic 
shape with one inflection point.  The results provide support for Hypothesis 1-b2.  Even 
though the results show support for this hypothesis because of the skewness, kurtosis, and 
linearity issues we have concerns in the viability of the model.   
 Results suggest a curvilinear relationship between the narcissism composite and 
the dependent variables return, CEO alpha, ROA and net ROA, providing support for 
Hypotheses 1-a1, 1-a2, and 1-b2.  Results fail to support Hypothesis 1-b1.  In Chapter 5, 
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we will more fully discuss which of the models is superior for this study.  Our ultimate 
selection for firm performance was return.  We thus chose to use the relationship between 
narcissism and return when testing the moderators described in Hypotheses 2 through 5. 
Moderators 
 The following portion of this chapter examines the relationship between the 
independent variable, narcissism composite with the dependent variable return.  We 
selected this model to evaluate against moderators more fully because of its statistical 
significance, simplicity, and applicability to practitioners.  The primary goal in this portion 
of the study is to examine the potential moderating effect of company lifecycle, firm size, 
industry, and CEO critical thinking.  For this reason, we have evaluated the moderators 
against the linear equation.   To examine these relationships, we used Hayes’s (2020) 
PROCESS Macro.  Due to the listwise deletion of variables of missing values created by 
the addition of the moderator, the base linear model of narcissism composite relationship 
to return slope will change slightly in each evaluation.  The resulting equations maintain 
the expected negative slope.   
Hypothesis 2 
 We examined whether the relationship between the CEO narcissism composite and 
company return is moderated by company lifecycle.  The model containing company 
lifecycle as a moderator of the relationship between the narcissism composite and return 
explained a significant proportion of variance in return (R2 = .311; F(3,111) = 9.4813, p < 
.001).  Narcissism composite was negatively related to return, but the relationship was not 
statistically significant (b = -.0103, p = .397).  Given that lifecycle is a multi-categorical 
value of 1, 2, 3, PROCESS creates 2 intercepts.  The moderation between lifecycle 1 and 2 
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(growth and mature) was not significant (b = .132, p = .445), and between lifecycle 2 and 
3 (mature and decline) was significant (b = -.0304, p = .047).  The total model explained a 
significant proportion of variance above the model with only the main effects (Δ R2 = 
.0910; ΔF (2,105) = 6.395, p = .002).  Thus, company lifecycle did significantly moderate 
the relationship between CEO narcissism and return.  
To understand the form of the interaction the simple slopes were examined.  The 
impact of CEO narcissism on return for growth companies was non-significant (b = -.103, 
p = .396).  The impact of CEO narcissism on return for mature companies was non-
significant (b = .000, p = .994).  The impact of CEO narcissism on return in declining 
companies was negative and significant (b = -.040, p < .001).  The form of the interaction 
is shown in the plot in Figure 4.17. 
Results do not provide support for Hypothesis 2.  We expected a positive 
relationship between CEO narcissism and return in growth stage companies, which was 
not supported.  Results also did not provide support for the negative relationship expected 
between CEO narcissism and return in mature companies.  Although the negative 
relationship between CEO narcissism and return in declining stage companies was 
significant, Hypothesis 2 had expected a positive relationship.  Results suggest that CEO 
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Supplemental Analysis of Lifecycle.  Boswell et al. (2018) hypothesized that not 
only would there be a curvilinear relationship between CEO narcissism and return but 
when moderated by company lifecycle it would shift.  Since only the declining stage 
company lifecycle is statistically significant, that is the model we tested with a curve 
estimation function.  We ran the analysis only on organizations that are in the declining 
stage.  We believe that the negative beta from PROCESS may mask a quadratic effect and 
thus is not necessarily directionally accurate.  The quadratic model is significant (F(1,23) 
= 4.193, p = .029), and indicated that narcissism composite explained a significant 
proportion of the variance in return (R2 = .276) an increase in R2 of .091 over the linear 
model.  The standardized regression coefficient was 6.544 (p = .133) and then -6.981 (p = 
.111) after the point of inflection.  Although the overall model is significant, we believe 
the limited number of observations (n=28) contributed to the non-significance of the 
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slopes.  The curvilinear shape (Figure 4.18) supports Boswell et al. (2018) and presents an 
opportunity for future research. 
 




We examined whether the relationship between the CEO narcissism composite and 
return is moderated by capitalization.  The model containing capitalization as a moderator 
of the relationship between the narcissism composite and return explained a significant 
proportion of variance in return (R2 = .1868; F(5,118) = 5.4214, p < .001).  Narcissism 
composite was negatively related to return and kept its statistical significance (b = -.027, p 
< .001).   
Given that industry is a multi-categorical value of 1 (small), 2 (mid), and 3 (large) 
PROCESS creates 2 intercepts.  To understand the form of the interaction simple slopes 
were examined.  The moderation between capitalization 1 and 2 (small and mid) was 
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significant (b = .0022, p = .024), and between capitalization 2 and 3 (mid and large) was 
not significant (b = -.026, p = .060).  The total model explained a significant proportion of 
variance above the model with only the main effects (Δ R2 = .0473; ΔF(2,118) = 3.4332, p 
= .035).  Thus, company capitalization did significantly moderate the relationship between 
CEO narcissism and return.  
To understand the form of the interaction simple slopes were examined.  The 
impact of CEO narcissism on return for small cap companies was significant (b = -.027, p 
<.001).  The impact of CEO narcissism on return was negative and non-significant for 
both mid cap companies (b = -.005, p < .529) and large cap companies (b = -.001, p = 
.968).  The form of the interaction is shown in the plot in Figure 1. 
Results do not provide support for Hypothesis 3.  Although the negative 
relationship between CEO narcissism and return in small companies was significant, 
Hypothesis 3 had expected a positive relationship.  We did expect a negative relationship 
in large cap companies; however, the interaction was not statistically significant.  Even 
though the interaction was negative it was less than the other mid and small companies 
which was not hypothesized.  Results suggest that CEO narcissism may not have any 
positive impact on return regardless of firm capitalization. 
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Supplemental Analysis of Capitalization.  Like the supplemental analysis on 
lifecycle, we explored the curvilinear nature of the slopes on the moderated multi-
categorical variable.  We evaluated our only statistically significant category, small-cap 
companies (n=90).  The quadratic model is significant (F(2,61) = 9.708, p  <  .001), and 
indicated that narcissism composite explained a significant proportion of the variance in 
return  (R2 = .241) an increase in R2 of .097 over the linear model.  Unlike the 
supplemental analysis on the lifecycle, both coefficients were statistically significant.  The 
results of the model were significant, and Figure 4.23 depicts the assertion of the slope 
being curvilinear.  The standardized regression coefficient was 5.430 (p = .011) and then -
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We examined whether the relationship between the CEO narcissism composite and 
return is moderated by industry.  The interaction explained a significant proportion of 
variance in return (R2 = .44.54; F(17,105) = 4.9608, p < .001). ).  CEO narcissism 
composite was negatively related to return and kept its statistical significance (b = -.0641, 
p < .001).  Information technology industry was not included in the analysis due to limited 
observations (n=1) resulting from listwise deletion of missing data.  Given that industry is 
a multi-categorical value of 1 through 9 PROCESS creates 8 intercepts.  The total model 
explained a significant proportion of variance above the model with only the main effects 
(Δ R2 = .1455; ΔF(8,105) = 6.395, p = .002).  Thus, industry did significantly moderate the 
relationship between CEO narcissism and return.  The results support Hypothesis 4.  
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To understand the form of the interaction simple slopes were examined.  The form 
of the interaction is shown in the plot in Figure 4.24.  The negative impact of CEO 
narcissism on return for communications services is the only industry that shows 
statistically significance (n=22, b = -.0641, p < .001).  The impact of CEO narcissism on 
return was positive in two industries, energy (n=6, b = .002, p = .929) and healthcare 
(n=24, b = .005, p = .701), but the relationship was not statistically significant.  The 
impact of CEO narcissism on return on the balance of the industries was negative and non-
significant; consumer discretionary (n=9, b = -.0003, p = .986), consumer staples (n=8, b = 
-.003, p = .841), financials (n=59, b = -.006, p =.471), industrials (n=30, b = -.004, p = 
.6042), materials (n=13, b = -.012, p = .564), and utilities (n=3, b = -.001, p = .944).  The 
direction of the slopes is ultimately impacted by the curvilinear relationship of narcissism 
and return.  
The results do support Hypothesis 4.  We made no a priori assumptions as to the 
direction or impact by industry, only that there would be an overall impact.  The 
significance of the model supports that assumption.  We will discuss in Chapter 5 the need 
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Supplemental Analysis on Industry.  To test our curvilinear assumption of the 
slopes we ran a curve estimation on the only significant industry slope, communication 
services.  The quadratic model is significant (F(2,12) = 5.736, p  = .022), and indicated 
that narcissism composite explained a proportion of the variance in CEO alpha  (R2 = 
.473) an increase in R2 of .168 over the linear model.  Unlike the supplemental analysis on 
lifecycle, both coefficients were statistically significant.  The results of the model were 
significant and Figure 4.25 graphicly depicts the curvilinear function.  The standardized 
regression coefficients, although not statistically significant are 8.364 (p = .092) and then -
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Figure 4.22: Communication Services Curve Estimation 
 
 
Hypothesis 5  
We examined whether the relationship between the CEO narcissism composite and 
company return is moderated by the CEO’s critical thinking ability.  The interaction 
explained a small proportion of variance in return and is not statistically significant (R2 = 
.0288; F(3,102) = 1.0087, p  = .3921).  The total model did not explain a significant 
proportion of variance above the model with only the main effects (Δ R2 = .0012; 
ΔF(1,102) = .1233, p = .7262).  CEO’s critical thinking ability did not moderate the 
relationship between CEO narcissism and return.  Results do not provide support for 
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Chapter 5  
DISCUSSION  
 The primary focus of this study was to evaluate the impact of CEO narcissism on 
the performance of their firm.  In our literature review, we highlight significant research 
on the negative impact of dark triad traits including narcissism.  Is this negative impact 
always the case and if not where and how does CEO narcissism impact company 
performance and does the level matter?   
The first question that we answer is how to quantify the performance of a firm.  
Our goal was to measure performance based on what is most important to the owner of the 
company.  At the most basic level, in the case of a public company the shareholder is 
focused on the return on investment.  The investor is also interested in the risk of their 
investment, but we chose to focus on the result for the investor, in this case, time-weighted 
return.  We will investigate the CEO's impact on risk in a future study.    
 We recognize that the CEO cannot control all things that impact their stock price 
so we also created a CEO alpha where we removed return that was created based on 
market movement or specific company characteristics such as size and industry.  Although 
not directly as applicable to the shareholder, we also chose to evaluate the CEO’s 
narcissistic trait level impact on internal accounting measures of success, such as ROE and 
ROA. 
 Next, we reviewed relevant literature to locate an appropriate measurement tool to 
evaluate narcissistic traits.  The ideal method is direct diagnosis by a trained professional 
(Boswell et al., 2018).  This method had two weaknesses for our research.  First, the 
diagnosis tends to focus on the disorder and not the underlying trait levels.  Second, if a 
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CEO has been evaluated, the chance of that result being available to the public (even if 
identities were hidden) is highly unlikely.  For that reason, previous research has largely 
taken the path of using external indicators to assess narcissism as discussed in our 
literature review.  Assessing narcissism via external indicators is not considered viable by 
psychologists who follow the premise that you cannot diagnose what you do not treat 
(Boswell et al., 2018).  We were able to obtain archival self-evaluation data in the form of 
CPI scores which gave us a unique opportunity in assessing narcissism.  Psychologists 
find the self-report method superior to external measures since they can validate the 
questions in the assessment.  We will highlight the challenges of this method in the 
limitations discussion.  
Unlike previous research discussed in the literature review, we a priori assumed 
that CEO narcissism is not always negative and in fact its impact could be curvilinear.  We 
expected an optimal level of narcissism in an organization’s CEO as determined by the 
firm’s financial performance (total return, CEO Alpha, ROA, and ROE).  We then 
evaluated each measure of success as a separate sub hypothesis.    
Return 
We first examined the relationship between narcissism and company success 
measures.  The effect of the narcissism composite was significant in explaining significant 
variance in return.  Consistent with previous research the slope was negative implying that 
the higher the narcissistic traits of the CEO the lower the expectation of return.  Results 
suggested a statistically significant negative linear relationship between return and CEO 
narcissism.  The negative relationship supports Greaves et al. (2014) assertion that 
narcissism has a negative impact on company performance.  To provide support for our 
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hypothesis, we needed to illustrate that the model is curvilinear representing an optimal 
level of narcissism.  Optimality would assume a single inflection or point of change.  To 
validate the curve shape, we also tested a cubic model to eliminate the potential of a 
second direction change in the curve.   
 The quadratic model between CEO narcissism and return was statistically 
significant.  The regression statistics for the cubic model are slightly more predictive than 
the quadratic model and both are significantly more predictive than the linear model.  The 
magnitude of the difference in effect from quadratic to cubic model (i.e., practical 
significance) was very small.  The quadratic model compared to the cubic model is 
parsimonious and easier to interpret how the two variables are interacting in application.  
We also could also find no theoretical reason to retain a cubic model.  For these reasons, 
we suggest that the quadratic function between CEO narcissism and return provides 
support for Hypothesis 1-a1.   
The inflection point in our model indicates a narcissism composite score of 56, 
which represents a score that is at the 56th percentile of the population as predicted by the 
CPI.  Our findings suggest that this is the optimal level in maximizing predicted return.  
Greaves et al. (2014) suggest that CEO narcissism decreases company performance.  
Contrary to Greaves et al. (2014) in our study increases in CEO narcissism increase 
company returns until the inflection point of 56.  After the point of inflection, results 
suggest that CEO narcissism levels beyond 56 detract from return.  Results indicate that 
when selecting or monitoring a CEO there is an optimal level of narcissism and a tool that 
can assess, and monitor narcissism level can be helpful in the process given non optimal 
CEO narcissism may negatively impact company returns. 
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It is worthy to consider that the optimal level is 6% higher than the average 
narcissism composite as determined by using the CPI 20 factors.  The results indicate that 
it may be appropriate to hire a CEO that has a higher level of narcissism as calculated by 
the narcissism composite.  This makes intuitive sense as the higher healthy levels of 
narcissism (Fatfouta, 2019) are justified based on the need for strength of personality in 
the organization’s top leader.   
We also found it interesting that the estimated optimal level is over one percent 
below the mean (M = 58.20) and median (Mdn = 58.43).  CEO narcissism scores in our 
study connote that companies on average hire CEOs that have narcissistic traits above the 
optimal point.   
CEO alpha 
We followed the same steps to examine narcissism as a predictor of company CEO 
alpha.  The analysis illustrates that like return, there is a significant negative linear 
relationship between CEO narcissism and CEO alpha.  Our a priori assumption of an 
optimal level of narcissism requires a curvilinear model.  Utilizing curve estimation, we 
measured the effect of the narcissism composite on CEO alpha.  We further tested if the 
model was quadratic or cubic.  The quadratic and cubic models were both statistically 
significant.  Similar to hypothesis 1-a1 results, SPSS excludes a predictor variable if the 
explanatory power is already contained in the other two variables (Field, 2014).  With the 
excluded variable leaving a model with one point of inflection we retained the more 
parsimonious quadratic model that provides support for Hypothesis 1-a2.  
The inflection point in the model using CEO alpha indicates a narcissism 
composite of 55.75, slightly lower than the 56 predicted by return.  It also suggests a result 
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contrary to Greaves et al. (2014) in that increases in narcissism level increase return until 
the inflection point of 55.75.  Results suggest that utilizing an assessment tool to assess 
CEO narcissism level can be useful in selecting and monitoring a CEO.   
At 5.75% higher than the average narcissism composite the model indicates it may 
be appropriate to hire a CEO that has a higher level of narcissism as calculated by the 
narcissism composite.  Compared to the mean and median CEO narcissism composite, this 
model also indicates that companies are hiring CEOs with narcissism levels above the 
optimal level. 
 We now have two hypotheses (1-a1 and 1-a2) that are supported by the results of 
the study.  Although not part of an overall hypothesis, in Chapter 2 we discuss how we 
favor the use of CEO alpha (over return) as it was created to eliminate market effects 
outside of the control of the CEO.  Given the similarities in the two models, which 
variable do we feel is more appropriate in practice?  To answer this question, we need to 
discuss how we believe the similarities in the results occurred.  Although there is 
significant variation in the mean and standard deviation of return (μ = .035, σ = .216) and 
CEO alpha (μ = -.065, σ = .199) they are highly and significantly correlated (r = .989, p < 
.001).  With CEO alpha being created by subtracting capitalization-weighted industry 
returns from total return, we did expect a high correlation between the two variables but 
did not contemplate the correlation occurring at this level.   
Since short term stock returns are highly endogenous, we felt it necessary to 
measure time-weighted return over long periods.  Also, to capture the full body of work of 
the CEO we calculated the return over their period of service.  We believe that the longer-
term aspect of the annualized return created a level of efficiency where both returns 
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represent the company’s variance from the market and the industry.  We believe that the 
length of time over which the time-weighted annual return was calculated allowed for 
efficient pricing in both the industry and company total returns (Fama & French, 1992).   
In addition, Fama and French (2004) assert that a consistent error term over time 
ultimately is investment alpha.  The combination of these theories would contemplate that 
both return and CEO alpha have an imbedded investment alpha and that the market return 
due to efficiency (reversion to the mean) equalizes over time allowing total return to not 
only resemble CEO alpha but itself leaving a differential of performance that is impact by 
the firm and not by the market.  Eliminating the industry and market return ignores the 
fact that the CEO is operating a company in that environment and needs to react to market 
and industry conditions.  The level of importance of capitalization and industry is 
investigated and discussed in the moderator portion of this work.   
 While both models explaining the impact of narcissism on return and CEO alpha 
produce rigorous and meaningful results, the model utilizing return explains more of the 
variance.  Total return is more parsimonious in its calculation, easier to understand and 
utilized by practitioners.  
Return on Equity 
During study design, we expected a significant relationship between narcissistic 
traits of a CEO and stock price performance.  Although our goal was to create a dependent 
variable that was most impactful to the shareholder, we were concerned that the many 
variables that impact stock price could render it ineffective in our model.  Still wanting to 
provide guidance to practitioners around CEO selection and ongoing performance based 
on their level of narcissistic traits, we wanted to avoid the impact of market anomalies on 
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our dependent variable.  ROE and ROA as accounting measures avoid market impact so 
we chose to use them as dependent variables representing company performance.  We also 
created and tested variables called net ROE and net ROA by subtracting industry ROE and 
industry ROA.  Like CEO alpha our desire was to eliminate impacts to ROE and ROA that 
are outside of the influence of the CEO.   
To test Hypothesis 1b, we followed the same process in testing hypothesis 1a. 
Linear regression was used to examine narcissism as a predictor of company ROE.  The 
linear model measuring the relationship between CEO narcissism and ROE was not 
statistically significant.  We chose to still check to see if by testing a quadratic or cubic 
model statistical significance would be achieved.  Both models failed to be statistically 
significant thus not providing support for Hypothesis 1-b1.  
 The relationship between CEO narcissism and net ROE had a better linear fit and 
explanatory power than ROE but was still outside of the bounds of significance.  We still 
checked to see if a quadratic or cubic model would provide a better fit.  Both models 
failed to be statistically significant.  The results do not provide support for Hypothesis 1-
b1.  These findings indicate that CEO narcissism may not have a significant impact on 
ROE because it may be that CEOs based on their levels of narcissism have a greater 
tendency to manipulate earnings (Capalbo et al, 2017).  Highly narcissistic CEOs can 
manipulate company accounting profit and asset value while staying within the bounds of 
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).   
Return on Assets 
With both ROE and ROA being accounting measures with return in the numerator 
we expected a degree of correlation.  The varying needs for capital and assets to run 
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unique businesses introduces variability between ROE and ROA.  Even with the expected 
unique nature of the two variables we were surprised at the lack of significant correlation 
in our data set (r = -.045, p = .618).  The lack of a significant association highlights that 
the two variables act independently and thus may produce different results, so we 
conducted the same analysis that we completed for ROE on ROA and net ROA.   
 The model measuring the effect of the narcissism composite and ROA was 
significant but did have issues with normality.  Unlike return, the CEO Alpha has a 
positive relationship with CEO narcissism.  A possible explanation of this anomaly over 
the rest of the dependent variables may be the ability for CEOs to have a greater tendency 
to manipulate earnings and how assets are measured (Capalbo et al, 2017).  Highly 
narcissistic CEOs can manipulate company accounting profit and asset value while staying 
within the bounds of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).  Thus, if the CEO 
with a high narcissistic composite manages earning and asset values to maximize his 
ROA, the expected regression would indicate a positive slope.   
We further conducted a curve estimate to determine if a quadratic equation would 
point to an optimal level of narcissism for the CEO.  Both the quadratic and cubic model 
were statistically significant.  Before determining our level of support for ROA we also 
tested net ROA.  The results measuring the impact of the narcissism composite and net 
ROA are statistically significant but with less explanatory power than ROA.  The same 
curve estimate analysis was completed.  The quadratic and cubic model are statistically 
significant.  For the same reasons highlighted in the discussion of return and CEO alpha 
and ROA, we chose to retain the quadratic model.   
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Like our evaluation of return vs CEO alpha, the net effect of ROA minus industry 
ROA is highly correlated ROA (r = .967, p <.001).  We believe that similar to return and 
CEO alpha (geometric means) ROA and net ROA are both averages that are calculated 
over the longer time periods of the CEO’s tenure.  As we did with return vs CEO alpha, 
we are selecting ROA over net ROA due to its calculation being more parsimonious.  
Although we find the results provide support for Hypothesis 1-b2, we have reservations as 
to the validity of the model and therefore refrain from making substantive conclusions.  
Our reservations of the support of this hypothesis stem from the data issues of 
skewness, kurtosis, and linearity discussed in chapter 4.  Additionally, if we believe that 
CEOs with high levels of narcissistic traits may have a higher likelihood to manipulate 
accounting measures to their organization’s benefit, it would change the shape of the 
curve thus eliminating the predictive power of the model if they are achieving the higher 
ROA (Capalbo et al, 2017).   
 In our discussion of return versus CEO alpha we highlighted the reason for 
selecting return as the dependent variable in our preferred model.  The narcissism 
composite’s impact on ROA and net ROA although significant has issues with normality 
and was less explanatory than return.  In addition, the significant impact of CEO 
narcissism on return is consistent with our goal of the success measure being one that the 
investor directly benefits from.  
 Our study’s findings with respect to the influence of CEO narcissism on ROE do 
not provide significant results and therefore are not effective at determining an optimal 
level of narcissism in a CEO.  Although narcissism levels are predictive of ROA, the 
model containing return as the predictive variable is superior.   
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Moderators 
 The moderators evaluated in this study included company lifecycle, industry, 
capitalization, and CEO critical thinking.  All pre-moderated equations showed the 
expected negative slope between CEO narcissism and return.   
Company Lifecycle 
 We examined whether the relationship between CEO narcissism and company 
return is moderated by company lifecycle.  The model containing CEO narcissism 
composite, company lifecycle, and the interaction explained a significant proportion of 
variance in return and was more predictive than the linear model, thus, company lifecycle 
did significantly moderate the relationship between CEO narcissism and return.  To 
understand the form of the interaction simple slopes were examined.  The relationship 
between CEO narcissism and company return was not significant in growth stage and 
mature stage companies.  However, results suggested that CEO narcissism had a 
significant and negative impact on company return in declining companies.  We had 
expected an upward shift in the need for narcissistic traits in growth stage and declining 
stage companies.  Therefore, the results did not support Hypothesis 2.   
Results suggest that CEO narcissism significantly and negatively impacts company 
return in declining companies.  This may be because in declining stage companies, the 
need for empathy, a healthy work culture, and the greater good of the organization may be 
more important than personality strength of the CEO than we expected in our a priori 
assumptions.  We also consider that the slope itself may not be negative but curvilinear. 
We further explored this relationship in declining stage companies and found a 
quadratic relationship.  The inflection point is at 57 similar to the inflection point of 56 in 
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the narcissism-return relationship, representing a 1% higher level of expected optimal 
narcissism for the declining stage companies.  This inflection point in declining stage 
companies suggests that there is an optimal level of the narcissism composite when 
measured on the impact of return in declining stage companies.  The higher optimal level 
of narcissism indicated by the higher inflection point of 57 for declining stage companies 
versus 56 for the all companies may indicate the need for strength of personality exhibited 
in higher levels of narcissism in declining stage companies as expected in our a priori 
assumptions. 
If we had the ability to run the same analysis on growth and mature companies, we 
could test if the optimal level dropped back to or below 56 for mature companies and at  
or above 57 for growth companies it would support our original Hypothesis 2.  The 
limited number of observations creates a challenge in getting to a level of statistical 
significance in the growth (n=48) and mature (n=87) stages, but the curvilinear shape is 
promising to potentially expand the idea of optimal levels of narcissism by lifecycle in 
Boswell et al. (2018) and an opportunity for future research. 
Capitalization 
We examined whether the relationship between CEO narcissism and company 
return is moderated by capitalization.  The model containing CEO narcissism composite, 
capitalization, and the interaction explained a significant proportion of variance in return.  
Capitalization did moderate the relationship between CEO narcissism and return, however 
our a priori expectation was that smaller companies would benefit from a CEO with 
higher narcissistic traits due to the need for strength of personality and action.  
Conversely, we expected the larger the company the need for those traits would lessen and 
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instead replaced by a leader who would consider the needs of the larger organization as 
opposed to their own.  The relative slopes were in the reverse order of what we 
hypothesized and did not support Hypothesis 3.   
We further found a significant quadratic relationship with an optimal level of 
narcissism composite at 55.5 (.5% lower than the 56 for the overall data set).  Results 
suggest a significant negative relationship between CEO narcissism and return in small-
cap companies after narcissism composite score reaches 55.5.  These findings suggest that 
capitalization does impact how CEO narcissism levels impact return.  Our finding of the 
quadratic relationship in small capitalization companies indicates an optimal level of 
narcissism based on capitalization and after that optimal point, CEO narcissism in small-
cap companies negatively impact company returns.  This suggests that smaller 
organizations may need a more empathetic leader that puts the needs of the organization 
and the employees above his own compared to the leader of the larger organization that 
needs the strength of personality suggested by higher narcissism levels to push for results 
in larger and potentially more bureaucratic organizations.  
Industry 
We examined whether the relationship between the CEO narcissism and company 
return is moderated by industry.  The model containing CEO narcissism composite, 
industry, and the interaction explained a significant proportion of variance in return above 
the model with only the main effects.  Thus, company industry did significantly moderate 
the relationship between CEO narcissism supporting Hypothesis 4. Looking at the 10 
industries, information technologies was excluded due to lack of sufficient data (n=1).  
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Similar to lifecycle and capitalization, industry had one significant and negative 
slope in communication services.  Two industries, energy and healthcare had insignificant 
positive slopes.  In the balance of the industries, CEO narcissism’s relationship to return 
was negative and non-significant including, consumer discretionary, consumer staples, 
financials, industrials, materials, and utilities.  Although lacking statistical significance we 
find it interesting that energy and healthcare industries indicate a need for higher levels of 
CEO narcissism for successful impact on return.  It may be that these industries have 
leadership needs that require higher levels narcissism and possibly a curvilinear impact.  
Even if not curvilinear it is intriguing to examine the level of variability in both direction 
and scale of the slopes and findings can be used by companies in varying industries in the 
selection and ongoing management of the CEO.   
To test our curvilinear assumption of the slopes we ran a curve estimation on the 
only significant industry slope, communication services.  The quadratic model was 
significant with an inflection point when the narcissism composite reaches 56.5 or .05% 
higher than the optimal narcissism composite of 56 for the entire data set.  The 
communications services industry is interesting in that it contains companies that comprise 
some of our economies growth sector such as social media and some in decline such as 
traditional media that includes newspapers.  We would expect both the growth companies 
and the companies in decline in this industry to favor CEOs with higher levels of 
narcissism.  The result of an optimal level of narcissism .5% higher than the total sample 
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Critical Thinking Ability “The Smart Narcissist” 
We examined whether the relationship between the CEO narcissism composite and 
company return is moderated by the CEO’s critical thinking ability.  The model containing 
CEO narcissism composite, CEO’s critical thinking ability, and the interaction was not 
significant and did not support Hypothesis 5.  Results suggest that the average CEO in our 
study has a critical thinking ability above 65.55% of the college educated population 
(Table 4.1).  We expected that the average CEO would have above average critical 
thinking ability but this analysis points that a high critical thinking ability does not help 
them mask the negative impacts of narcissism on return.   
Implications for Research 
 This study expands the body of knowledge on narcissistic leadership in three areas; 
measurement methodology, the curvilinear relationship between narcissism and firm 
investment performance, and the changing impact of narcissistic leadership based on the 
firm's lifecycle, capitalization, and industry. 
 Previous research primarily utilizes externally observed factors to assess 
narcissism in CEOs.  In our literature review, we cite 17 articles that use external 
measures.  Brennan and Conroy (2013) attemts to determine if narcissism can be 
determined from a distance.  Although they conclude that it does, psychologists feel that 
it’s challenging to make the assumptions from afar (Boswell et al, 2018).  Self-reported 
measures such as CPI have been supported as effective measures of narcissistic traits 
(Wink & Gough, 1990).  
Grijalva and Newman (2014) and Rosenthal and Pittinsky (2006) view narcissism 
as a primary predictor of counterproductive work behavior (CWB).  Therefore, our results 
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should also extend CWB research especially regarding the moderating effects we have 
identified between narcissism and return.  Grijalva et al. (2014) found that narcissism 
displays a positive effect on leadership emergence highlighting the potential positive 
aspect of narcissistic traits.  Our novel finding of a curvilinear effect using stock price 
change (return) supports that there is the potential for an optimal level of narcissistic traits 
which informs leadership theory beyond narcissism.   
Implications for Practice  
These research findings may guide CEO selection.  The information could be used 
by boards of directors and executive recruiters.  Firms that can conduct a self-evaluation 
on their CEO candidate can determine if the candidate’s scores are in the optimal range.  
Based on the outcome of interest they can determine if the needed level is higher or lower 
for their specific situation.   
The information may help in CEO oversight and management, determining what 
needs to be monitored, and when it is time to make a change.  As a firm transitions 
through lifecycle and capitalization, results may inform the changing needs in level of 
narcissistic traits in their top leader.   
CEOs who are willing to assess and address their narcissistic tendencies may be 
able to better manage their organization through various phases of evolution.  In addition 
to the assessment or reassessment of their traits, they could obtain coaching to moderate 
their tendencies in an effort to maximize company returns.  
Limitations 
Our findings have potential limitations stemming from the research design and 
data structure.  First, although our analysis focusses on the impact of CEO narcissism on 
112 
CEO Narcissism and Firm Performance 
company performance, there is no assurance that the inverse relationship may be taking 
place.  Companies of certain performance levels may be inclined to select a CEO with that 
level of narcissism thus reversing causal direction of the relationship.  Although we have 
not contemplated away to test the inverse relationship of the variables, the study as 
defined provides a model that can be utilized by practitioners.     
The primary independent variable is a CEO narcissism composite based on the 
work of Wink and Gough (1990) utilizing the self-reported CPI to measure narcissistic 
trait levels.  In lieu of a direct diagnosis of individuals with narcissistic personality 
disorder, it is difficult to measure narcissistic traits.  This study is not intending to 
diagnose a disorder but to estimate traits.  Given the impracticality of directly diagnosing 
CEOs, researchers choose between external or self-reported measures.  A criticism of self-
reporting is the ability of the participant to answer to make themselves look good.  This 
would be particularly worrisome if the subject had a high level of narcissism thus making 
them more likely to self-aggrandize and weaken the validity of the results of the 
assessment.  We feel that this is mitigated by three validity factors inside the CPI that are 
proven to detect and then invalidate the results (Research Department CPP Inc., 2007).  
Our study included no data from assessments that failed the validity tests.   
Our study utilized the CPI to determine the level of narcissistic traits of the CEO at 
one point in time of the assessment.  We did not have the ability to have a periodic 
assessment to assess if there was a change in the CEO’s scores over time.  We believe that 
although multiple assessments per CEO could add additional insights to our study, the 
likelihood of significant change of traits is slow.  Change in traits can be situational and 
can be accelerated with coaching or therapy (Rosenthal & Pittinsky, 2006).   
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The next limitation for consideration is the sample size.  Although we began with 
over 62,000 assessments conducted for over 700 firms, after screening the data to only 
include publicly traded firms that had assessed their CEO (pre or post hire) we ended up 
with a sample size of 180 which is a fraction of the just under 4000 public US 
corporations.  We exceeded the 75 observations that we felt was needed to achieve 
validity to draw conclusions from the study’s findings.    
Our limited data set could have contributed to the high level of skewness and 
kurtosis in each of our four dependent variables.  The skewness and kurtosis conditions 
were created by a small group of outliers discussed in the results section of the study.  We 
chose not to eliminate the outliers and accept the skewness and kurtosis.  The outliers 
themselves were extremely high or low performing companies that if eliminated would 
have removed valuable data and predictors of the optimal level. 
The company lifecycle variable has limitations in that there is no single agreed 
upon method for determination where a company is on the lifecycle continuum.  We chose 
to rely on the work of Martinson (2012) as we felt the method used was parsimonious and 
included a thorough literature review.  Additionally, we did not account for the potential 
of a company changing lifecycle categories during the CEO’s tenure but instead relied on 
an average revenue growth across tenure.   
The final potential limitation is the source of our data.  CMA kindly agreed to 
provide anonymous blinded data for the study.  They are one of the top firms in the 
professional development industry and conduct business with organizations across the 
country and throughout the world.  The data is archival and is compiled from client 
relationships so there is no way to assure there is not a concentration of unknown factors. 
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We have highlighted the concentrations by industry and capitalization in the results 
section.  In addition, CMA’s location in St. Louis, Missouri may lead to a greater 
percentage of Midwest companies in the data set.  We do not think this potential data 
concentration meaningfully impacts the outcome of our study.  
Future Directions  
This study provides the opportunity for additional analysis to expand and clarify its 
findings and create additional avenues of research for further examination of narcissism, 
leadership, and company performance.  The validity of external measures determining 
narcissistic traits can be challenging.  O’Reilly et al. (2014) evaluated their use and 
determined while not without issue they can be predictive.  The external measures in their 
research can be extended and validated by creating a relationship to known self-reported 
indicators of narcissistic traits measures such as the CPI.  This type of analysis could 
extend to additional externally observed behaviors that impact firm performance and tend 
to aggrandize the CEO.  Examples include CEOs participating in their organization’s 
commercials, building significant corporate headquarters, and the use of corporate aircraft.  
In our discussion of ROE and ROA, we note how narcissistic CEOs through the 
use of accruals can impact earnings and thus change ROE and ROA (Capalbo et al, 2017).  
Can this same level of narcissism lead a CEO to believe that their share price is 
undervalued and repurchase it?  If research supported the existence of this behavior, it 
would significantly impact ROE.  We feel this impact of narcissistic CEOs warrants 
additional study.   
Our study used a time-weighted rate of return over the CEO's tenure.  Future 
research could evaluate if narcissistic trait levels impact CEO tenure.  Additionally, future 
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research can investigate not only if narcissistic traits impact CEO tenure but also why.  
Does CEO narcissism change over time and if so, how does it occur?  Could a CEO 
exhibit higher or lower narcissistic tendencies in certain circumstances such as in times of 
stress?  Future research could assess how these changes impact firm performance.   
Using upper echelons theory, we concluded that the CEO’s leadership style 
impacted firms’ performance.  An extension of the theory would be to use all C-suite 
executes to look at team narcissism.  This type of analysis could also be extended to how 
narcissism impacts performance based on the interactions of the C-suite team similar to 
the work of Grijalva et al. (2020) on the interaction of narcissistic team members in the 
NBA. 
Our work was limited to public companies to be able to use stock price 
performance.  We speculate that venture capital firms and private equity firms seeking to 
acquire, and “flip” under-performing firms likely will benefit from highly narcissistic 
leaders and extend the thought that narcissism optimal levels are impacted by the 
companies needs and situation.  Due to a lack of available public data, we did not include 
this in the current study.  Although not public it could be possible to get company 
performance data from private equity funds and investors.   
We believe that our curvilinear examination of CEO narcissism could be extended 
to include the impacts of risk.  Our use of stock performance and the use of self-reported 
measures and curvilinear findings could be combined with the work of Harrison et al. 
(2020) on CEO narcissism perceptions and risk and how that impacts the performance of 
the company.   
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Although we were able to illustrate that company lifecycle and capitalization are 
significant moderators of the relationship between CEO narcissism and return, results did 
not support our a priori assumption of higher optimal level of narcissistic traits for growth 
and declining companies and small and mid-capitalization companies.  An extension of 
the research could also determine if the slopes of the categorical variables are themselves 
curvilinear.  The curvilinear shape could potentially support the hypothesis in Boswell et 
al. (2018) that assumes that optimal level of narcissism occurs in growth stage and 
declining stage companies that is greater than that of the mature organization even though 
their linear counterparts did not.  In addition, if the shift of the moderated effect is 
curvilinear, it gives the potential of the optimal level being higher in the lifecycle and 
capitalization could ultimately support Hypothesis 2 and 3.   
The results did support that industry moderates the effect of the narcissism 
composite on return.  We contemplated but ultimately made no a priori assumption as to 
the impact of specific industries.  Additional research examining curvilinear relationships 
is warranted to determine an industry specific optimal level of narcissism creating 
additional insight for those hiring and employing CEOs in specific industries. 
Lastly, CMA has recently joined into a partnership with one of the world’s leading 
executive recruiting firms specializing in hiring CEOs.  Our ability to extend the study 
with additional data can be used to enhance the validity of this study and other future 
study findings.   
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General Conclusions 
By evaluating the relationship between CEO narcissism measured by a narcissism 
composite created from the 20-factor output of the CPI and corporate success measures as 
our dependent variables, our results provided support that the impact of CEO narcissism is 
curvilinear.  The curvilinear nature of the relationships allows the practitioner to look at 
the level of narcissism at the point of infection as optimal.  After testing four success 
measures (return, CEO alpha, ROE, and ROE) we found the model containing return as 
the dependent variable to be the most explanatory.  In addition to being the most 
explanatory, it is the most parsimonious.  Practitioners can easily understand time-
weighted rate of return and how it is used in practice to evaluate the CEO’s success.  
Although the analysis of lifecycle and capitalization did not support our a priori 
assumptions, the results did support lifecycle, capitalization, and industry as moderators 
and gives additional insight into how CEO’s narcissistic trait level can impact firms in 
different ways depending on their specific circumstances.  It will allow the practitioner to 
customize their assumptions of the optimal level of narcissistic traits based on the specific 
assignment circumstance.  In addition, although critical thinking was not found to be a 
significant moderator the slope directions were in line with our a priori assumptions and 
merit further investigation.   
We are encouraged that these findings may provide guidance on CEO selection by 
boards of directors and executive recruiters.  The potential exists to also use the findings 
in CEO oversight.  We also believe that the significant moderators of industry, lifecycle 
and capitalization can guide practitioners in CEO selection and oversight based on their 
company’s circumstances.    
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